The Cultural Transmission of Trust Norms: Evidence from a Lab in the Field on a Natural Experiment by Rubin, Jared & Karaja, Elira
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
ESI Working Papers Economic Science Institute
4-2017
The Cultural Transmission of Trust Norms:






Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers
Part of the Econometrics Commons, Economic Theory Commons, and the Other Economics
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in ESI Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rubin, J., & Karaja, E. (2017). The cultural transmission of trust norms: Evidence from a lab in the field on a natural experiment. ESI
Working Papers 17-08. Retrieved from http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/218/
The Cultural Transmission of Trust Norms: Evidence from a Lab in the
Field on a Natural Experiment
Comments
Working Paper 17-08
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/218
The Cultural Transmission of Trust Norms:





We conduct trust games in three villages in a northeastern Romanian commune. From 1775-1919, these
villages were arbitrarily assigned to opposite sides of the Austrian and Ottoman/Russian border despite
being located seven kilometers apart. All three villages were ruled by outsiders to Romania, with Russian
and Ottoman fiscal institutions being more rapacious. We conjecture that this history, combined with
historical selective migration, contributed to a culture of trust of outsiders (relative to co-villagers) on the
Austrian side of the border. Our design permits us to test this conjecture, and more generally, whether
historically-derived cultural norms are transmitted intergenerationally. We find that participants on the
Austrian side that also have family roots in the village are indeed more likely to trust outsiders but less
likely to trust co-villagers.
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1 Introduction
Although it may seem obvious to a casual observer that “culture matters” for economic and political decision-
making, it is not so obvious how it matters. How do we distinguish between cultural stimuli and economic,
political, or institutional stimuli? To what degree do these stimuli feed into each other? Indeed, how
do we even begin to quantify culture? The difficulty in providing satisfactory answers to these questions
long dissuaded social scientists from investigating the connection between culture and political/economic
outcomes, eschewing it as either untestable or unimportant.
However, culture has received a much revived interest from social scientists in the last two decades. While
the term “culture” can mean many things, this literature generally conceptualizes culture as distinct from
economic and institutional stimuli by defining it as the heuristics employed by people within a society to
interpret the complex world around them (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich et al. 2001; Wedeen 2002;
Nunn 2012; Mokyr 2016; Greif and Mokyr 2016; Alston et al. 2016; Roland 2017; Giuliano and Nunn 2017).1
Within economics and political science, the causes and consequences of trust have received special attention.
Trust is crucial to economic and political development (Arrow 1972; Putnam 1993; Whiteley 2000; Uslaner
and Brown 2005; Karlan et al. 2009; Tabellini 2010; Algan and Cahuc 2010, 2013; Butler et al. 2016), and
those heuristics that people use to determine whether or not to trust others and under which conditions to
trust others clearly differ by society (Henrich et al. 2001). There are also practical reasons social scientists
have recently focused on trust: there are numerous measures of trust collected in survey data (Fisman and
Khanna 1999; Zak and Knack 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Bahry et al. 2005; Hooghe et al. 2009;
Aghion et al. 2010; Durante 2010; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Kasara 2013; Becker et al. 2016); and trust
experiments are among the most widely used in experimental studies, both in the lab and in the field (Berg
et al. 1995; Glaeser et al. 2000; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Fehr et al. 2002; Barr 2003; Karlan 2005;
Sutter and Kocher 2007; Sapienza et al. 2013; Robinson 2016).
The most difficult issue the literature faces is one of identification: how do we know when a determi-
nant is “culture” and when it is some (potentially unobservable or institutional) variable related to culture?
Convincing identification strategies used to separate cultural determinants from other economic, political,
1Following from important works such as Putnam (1993) and Greif (1994, 2006), the recent literature seeks historical channels
through which distinct cultural attributes formed and still affect decision-making heuristics in the present. For instance, Guiso
et al. (2016) subject Putnam’s hypothesis to a rigorous empirical test, showing that differences in medieval institutions and
the resulting social capital differences had an impact in northern Italy but not in southern Italy. Greif’s work falls into a much
broader literature which views institutions as the carriers of carriers of the historical—and hence cultural—past. Also see North
(1990), David (1994), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Tabellini (2008a), Dell
(2010), Voigtlaender and Voth (2012), Alesina et al. (2013), Jha (2013), Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017), Greif and Tabellini
(2017), and Dell and Olken (2017). For excellent overviews of recent developments in the culture and institutions literature, see
Guiso et al. (2006), Nunn (2012), and Alesina and Giuliano (2015). For important overviews of recent works on the cultural
transmission of traits and its effect on long run economic development, see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) and Gershman (2017).
Of particular relevance to the current paper is Algan and Cahuc (2013), who provide a nice review of the literature on trust
and economic outcomes, and Nannestad (2008), who overviews the literature on generalized trust.
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sociological, or institutional determinants have included instrumental variables (Uslaner and Brown 2005;
Tabellini 2010; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011), regression discontinuity (Grosfeld et al. 2013; Grosfeld and
Zhuravskaya 2013; Karaja 2013; Becker et al. 2016; Buggle 2016), and laboratory or field experiments (Fer-
shtman and Gneezy 2001; Cassar et al. 2013; Adida et al. 2016; Bigoni et al. 2016; Butler et al. 2016;
Robinson 2016; Lowes et al. 2017; Jeon et al. 2017).2 Yet, there are tradeoffs inherent in each of these
approaches. Instrumental variables are excellent at removing the bias from the regression coefficients in
question and counteracting omitted variable biases inherent in historical data, but they often cannot pro-
vide much additional insight into the pathway through which culture is transmitted and affects outcomes.3
Regression discontinuity analyses address this concern—so long as there are not multiple important causal
implications of the discontinuity in question—but they come with the tradeoff that discontinuities are fre-
quently not completely exogenous. Long borders, the most commonly used feature over which regression
discontinuity analyses are employed, are rarely random along the entirety of the border; they are often
formed by geographical barriers, the commercial importance of the region, and the capacity of the center to
collect taxes from either side of the border.4 Finally, most experiments seeking to understand how people
with different cultural backgrounds behave in different environments do indeed shed significant light on how
people act—often in contradiction to conventional economic theory—but they have difficulty isolating the
cultural determinants of subjects’ actions.5
Our paper aims to address some of these tradeoffs by combining a “lab in the field” experiment with a
natural experiment.6 The idea is straight-forward: if one can find a natural experiment in which a historical
border was arbitrarily drawn, even if over a small expanse, and there is reason to believe that there are
historical mechanisms on either side of the border affecting culture, one can more finely pinpoint the degree
2Some papers have also exploited historical patterns that are likely only explicable through culture. For instance, Gangadharan
et al. (2017) run lab in the field experiments in Cambodia, showing that participants who were directly affected by the Khmer
Rouge genocide exhibit more anti-social behavior in the present. Algan and Cahuc (2010) exploit variation in immigration
patterns to the US to isolate the inherited component of trust and test its impact on economic outcomes. Giuliano (2007) also
exploits immigration patterns to the US to isolate cultural differences between southern and northern Europeans with respect
to how long children live with their parents. Giuliano’s findings suggest that culture accounts for several stylized facts that
purely social scientific explanations cannot account for. More insight into inter-generational cultural transmission is provided
by Giuliano and Nunn (2017), who find that groups whose ancestors lived in more stable environments place a greater emphasis
on maintaining tradition in the present.
3A large theoretical literature addresses the mechanisms through which cultural transmission occurs. Bisin and Verdier (2001),
Tabellini (2008b), and Guiso et al. (2008) focus primarily on the intra-family transmission process, while Dohman et al. (2012)
highlight the role of assortative mating and the local environment. Bisin and Verdier (2017), Kimbrough et al. (2008), Greif
and Tadelis (2010), and Iyigun and Rubin (2017) provide arguments for how culture and institutions interact.
4While one can run a test for pre-existing differences on either side of the discontinuity (e.g., Becker et al. 2016), such data
from the pre-existing period are often much worse due to their historical nature and are subject to omitted variable bias. One
example of a set of long, exogenous borders are those created in the ”scramble for Africa”. The borders were created in a
European board room with little concern for ethnic or geographical boundaries (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016).
5For instance, if subjects from northern and southern Italy act differently in trust games (Bigoni et al. 2016), it is possible that
this is due to differences in social capital between the two regions (Putnam 1993) or some other cultural factor; and there are
many other differences between the two regions which are difficult to account for in an experimental setting.
6For a recent survey of the “lab in the field” literature, with all its benefits and pitfalls, see Gneezy and Imas (2016). A similar
“lab in the field on a natural experiment” method is used to provide insight into public good provision in India (Chaudhary et
al. 2017).
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to which cultural differences persisted by running laboratory experiments on subjects on either side of the
border. The primary challenges of such an undertaking are: i) finding an arbitrarily drawn border—as noted
above, most long borders are not arbitrary; ii) finding a border in which there is reason to believe there
were cultural differences generated by the border; and iii) isolating the border effects from other economic
determinants which may also be different on either side of the border.
We address these challenges by running trust games on either side of an old Austrian (Habsburg) border
in the Udes¸ti Commune located in northeastern Romania. This commune provides an ideal setting for testing
the role that historically-generated cultural differences played in generating modern-day trust behavior for
four reasons. First, a “natural experiment” occurred within the commune after it was annexed by the
Austrians following the Treaty of Ku¨c¸u¨k Kaynarca in 1774, in which the Ottomans ceded the Bukovina
region of Moldavia to the Austrians (see Figure 1). One of the villages in the commune, S¸tirba˘t, was left
on the Ottoman side despite there being a more natural river border to the north of S¸tirba˘t (see Figure
2). Historical records indicate that this decision was due in large part to the idiosyncratic predilections of
one landowner in S¸tirba˘t, not some economic or geographical calculus. This “natural experiment” therefore
satisfies the arbitrariness criterion. The border was not created by economic, military, or even geographical
considerations, but was the result of the idiosyncratic desires of one individual over two centuries ago.
Second, a large literature suggests that the decentralized, efficient, and (relatively) corruption-free Aus-
trian administration fostered trust in government (Becker et al. 2016; Karaja 2013; Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007;
Subtelny 2007; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013), while the Ottoman administrative system known as the
malikane system was rapacious (I˙nalcık 1973; Cos¸gel et al. 2013). This helped contribute to a relative
paucity of trust in the former Ottoman lands (Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007; Karaja 2013). Although Moldavia
(i.e., the region containing S¸tirba˘t) entered the Russian sphere of influence in 1829, Russian administration
was similarly rapacious (Subtelny 2007; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013). Since all three of these empires
were outsiders to Romania, we conjecture that these histories should have affected the “cultural lens” through
which individuals on either side of the border trusted outsiders more generally. In other words, our experi-
ment is designed to test whether people from villages that were “treated” with Austrian rule (as opposed to
Ottoman rule, which had existed in the region since the 15th century) trust outsiders more than those that
were not treated. Moreover, there is evidence of selective migration into (non-Austrian) S¸tirba˘t in the late
18th century. The first settlers were either forced to settle (as part of Madame S¸tirbet¸’s corve´e) or migrated
due to dislike of their new Austrian overlords. Importantly, both of these phenomena—administrative dif-
ferences and selective migration—suggest that a culture of relative “trust of outsiders” may have emerged
in the late 18th and 19th centuries on the Austrian side of the border.7 The historical border therefore
7For more on the very large literature on in-group favoritism, see Tajfel et al. (1971), Brewer (1999), Brown (2000), Bahry et al.
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Figure 1: The Austrian-Ottoman Border in the Late-18th Century
satisfies the cultural difference criterion. There is reason to believe that cultural differences were generated
by historical events on other side of the border and are not merely associated with the border for spurious
reasons.
Third, the commune was reunified in 1919, meaning that for nearly a century the commune has shared
common governance, fiscal institutions, communist legacies, and many other features one might expect would
affect contemporary trust. The natural experiment therefore satisfies the historical channel criterion. Post-
World War I economic and political events cannot explain differences between the villages, since they have
been subject to the same forces for nearly a century. While it is likely true that political and economic
(2005), Yuki et al. (2005), Tanis and Postmes (2005), Ruﬄe and Sosis (2006), Balliet, Wu, and de Dreu (2014), and Robinson
(2016).
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Figure 2: Udes¸ti, Poieni, and S¸tirba˘t Villages
differences persist in general on either side of the old Austrian-Ottoman border, one of the advantages of our
methodology is that the three villages under study are small enough that any such differences would have
been unlikely to survive the Communist period, in which the villages were placed under the same communal
leadership. Hence, if differences in trust across villages are found, especially if they are in the expected
direction, cultural differences generated by the historical border are a plausible root cause.
Finally, our experiment allows us to parse whether those whose families have lived in the villages for
multiple generations—and were thus presumably more imbued with the culture of their ancestors—exhibit
different trust behavior than those who are relative newcomers. Ancestral information was obtained in a
post-experiment survey. Should such differences arise, they would provide further evidence that the inter-
generational transmission of culture underlies our results rather than some unobserved differences between
the villages.
The experimental design entails playing trust games in two villages on the Austrian side of the border
(Udes¸ti and Poieni)8 and one on the Ottoman/Russian (hence, non-Austrian) side (S¸tirba˘t). Figure 2
depicts just how close these villages are to each other; each is within walking distance of the other two
villages. Ideally we would have run trust games in a second village on the non-Austrian side, but S¸tirba˘t is
the only village in the commune that satisfies this criterion. Participants in all villages played trust games
with both co-villagers and people from one of the other villages (hence, outsiders). Our “treated” group is
8Udes¸ti is the name of both the commune as well as a village in the commune. To avoid confusion, we refer to the former as the
“Udes¸ti Commune” throughout the paper.
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therefore those whose villages were treated with Austrian institutions (Udes¸ti and Poieni), while our control
group is those whose village was not (S¸tirba˘t). We also analyze actions between the two treated (Austrian)
villages, under the hypothesis that there should be no differences, on average, in actions between the two.
Our findings support the conjecture that historically-induced culture affects contemporary trust and that
inter-generational transmission is a plausible mechanism. First, we find that participants on the treated
(Austrian) side of the border have greater trust of subjects from outside their village (i.e., they send more
tokens). Meanwhile, no (significant) differences in trust behavior are found between the two treated vil-
lages. Second, we find that these inter-village differences in trust of outsiders only arise for subjects whose
grandparents are from the village in question. We interpret this result as evidence of an inter-generational
transmission mechanism; it is only those subjects whose families experienced the institutional differences of
1774-1919—or, at the very least, subjects whose grandparents grew up with people that experienced these
differences—that showed differences in trust of outsiders.9
We do not wish to over-interpret our results for three reasons. First, these findings will be difficult, if
not impossible, to replicate. In such small villages, one would be worried about playing the same game
twice. Second, in one respect we identify cultural differences off of three village-level observations. In such
a micro-level study, it is possible that some unknown, benign event in one of the villages’ historical past is
responsible for our results. Third, the external validity of our methodology is not obvious. Such issues are
not faced with larger-N studies that employ IV or regression discontinuity to identify cultural differences.
For this reason, we do not advocate that a “low-N” study like ours be the first attempt at identifying cultural
persistence across different populations. Instead, we suggest that such studies be done in conjunction with
other high-N studies employing some other technique to address identification. In the specific historical case
we study, such studies have been undertaken (Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007; Karaja 2013; Becker et al. 2016),
supporting the external validity of our results. Hence, since our study addresses precisely the primary
tradeoffs faced by other methodologies used to address cultural persistence, the present study should be
viewed as complementary to existing studies. Indeed, the fact that our results are consistent with much of
the literature cited above lends credibility to both sets of results.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 overviews the relevant historical facts of the villages in which
we conduct the experiment. Section 3 summarizes the experimental procedure. Section 4 informally maps
out a theory, based on the literature, of what we should expect to see in the experiment if the cultural
transmission of trust norms is indeed salient. Section 5 reports the results, and Section 6 concludes.
9Vertical cultural transmission cannot account for all of our results. Among participants whose grandparents are not from the
village, those from the Austrian side of the border trust co-villagers less than those from the non-Austrian side. We consider
explanations for these results in Section 5.
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2 Historical Background: The Udes¸ti Commune
2.1 Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian Administration
There were numerous institutional differences between the Austrian Habsburg Empire and its two eastern
neighbors, the Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire, which may affect contemporary trust. Perhaps the
most important Austrian institutional feature for the present study was the relative autonomy of local
governance (including in Romania, as we highlight in the next section). The Habsburgs had long permitted
(though perhaps not desired) strong free independent cities, which were independent centers of political,
economic, and cultural activity. Administrative and cultural autonomy was also the norm in the more
peripheral Austrian territories, where locals manned the bureaucracy and were permitted wide purview over
economic, religious, and cultural matters (Subtelny 2007; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013). Indeed, there is
a large literature, summarized by Becker et al. (2016), suggesting that the Austrian bureaucracy was known
for its honesty, diligence, fairness, efficiency, and freedom from corruption. When the Habsburgs acquired
new territories, locals were sent to Vienna for extensive administrative training before returning to work in
the bureaucracy. As a result, the Austrian bureaucracy was largely respected by the population, even in
newly acquired territories where the Austrians were ostensibly “outsiders” (Becker et al. 2016).
In contrast, the Russians rarely compromised on their autocratic prerogatives or gave political power to
local elites. Local elites were given socio-economic privileges in order to ensure their subservience to the
tsar, who imposed oppressive cultural, social, and economic policies on regions that were not fully integrated
or assimilated into the empire (Subtelny 2007; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013). As a result, there were few
local power bases outside of the central government, and the ties between local elites and the masses were
much weaker than they were in the Habsburg lands (Subtelny 2007). In other words, the relatively rapacious
elites in Russian governance would have been viewed as outsiders, especially in peripheral territories like
Romania. Meanwhile, the Ottoman political structure became decentralized after the 17th century, as local
notables acquired control over most local political and economic affairs (I˙nalcık 1973; Barkey 1994; Cos¸gel
et al. 2013). But unlike the Austrian regime, which maintained a tight relationship with the local nobility
and therefore maintained some level of control over corruption, Ottoman decentralization was a result of the
center’s inability to collect revenue or provide local law and order. The Ottoman central authorities could
do little to prevent corruption and expropriation.10
10Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007) points to other institutional and legal advantages provided by the Austrians, including protection of
property rights, relative freedom from corruption, autonomy for local governance, and provision of public goods. With respect
to property rights, the Austrians permitted private ownership as early as the 17th century, abolished serfdom in the late 18th
century, increased peasants’ rights, ended censorship, and ensured freedom of enterprise in 1859. Meanwhile, the Ottomans
did not permit private ownership until the 19th century (all land belonged to the Sultan) and permitted local military lords to
take arbitrary levies and surcharges, resulting in massive extortion and oppression of the masses, especially in the southeastern
European Ottoman provinces. The deteriorating Ottoman fiscal situation encouraged predatory behavior on the part of tax
7
In short, the institutional differences between the Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires relevant for
this study are autonomy of local governance, freedom from corruption, and protection of property rights. A
growing literature suggests that these differences helped shape cultural attitudes that have persisted to the
present day. Becker et al. (2016) employ a regression discontinuity around the old Habsburg border and find
that Habsburg affiliation increases trust with respect to government institutions and reduces corruption (i.e.,
bribery) in contemporary courts and police. They argue that norms of functional citizen-state interactions,
along with a decentralized and honest bureaucracy, affected trust in local public services and levels of
corruption in local administration. Karaja (2013) uses a similar design across the old Austrian-Ottoman
border and finds higher willingness to bribe, lower trust of public officials, and lower growth in GDP per
capita in the old Ottoman lands. Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007) uses a variety of econometric techniques and finds
that Habsburg successor states have more efficient market economies, greater protection of property rights,
lower risk of government exploitation of private investors, lower levels of corruption, higher trust in the
government, greater governmental effectiveness, and stronger civil society than Ottoman successor states.
These outcomes can all be explained by the differences in Austrian and Ottoman institutions highlighted
in this section. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2013) find that within Poland, Habsburg and Russian legacies
affect contemporary voting patterns, with people in former Habsburg lands being more likely to vote for both
liberals and religious conservatives. They cite Austrian local autonomy, especially with regard to religious
issues, as the reason for support of religious conservatives, while differences in governance institutions affected
beliefs in democracy on both sides of the border and thus support for liberals.11
This literature therefore suggests that Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian institutional differences may
still affect a host of economic, cultural, and political features generally considered important for economic
development. Foremost among these is trust. Although the literature focuses on trust in government, we
conjecture that the fact that these empires were “outsiders” in Romania, in combination with the manner in
which the empires administered local governance, should have manifested itself in trust of “outsiders” more
generally. Austrian officials were “insiders”—local elites who became steeped in Austrian bureaucratic prac-
tices. Meanwhile, Ottoman and Russian government officials would have been outsiders to a vast majority
of their subjects. Their widespread corruption and imposition on property rights decreased trust in public
officials, and likely decreased trust in outsiders more generally.
A large experimental literature suggests that “outgroup” trust is in part culturally determined (Tajfel et
al. 1971; Brewer 1999; Brown 2000; Bahry et al. 2005; Yuki et al. 2005; Tanis and Postmes 2005; Ruﬄe and
farmers—illegal taxes and land reallocation were common—and the sultan was hesitant to intervene since this may have
worsened his fiscal straits (Cos¸gel et al. 2013; Karaja 2013).
11In a related study, Grosjean (2011) finds that Ottoman rule is associated with lower contemporary financial development, even
within countries that were partially ruled by the Ottoman Empire.
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Sosis 2006; Robinson 2016), although it can also be generated in the lab (Chen and Li 2009).12 The Austrian,
Ottoman, and Russian institutional legacies therefore suggest the possibility—should the cultural differences
generated by these institutions over a century ago be sticky enough to exist in the present—that outgroup
trust should be greater for descendants of the Austrian Empire. In Section 4, we more formally lay out this
and other predictions related to differences in trust between those from the Austrian and non-Austrian sides
of the old border. Before we provide the intuition underlying these hypotheses, we provide the historical
background of the natural experiment in Romania that we exploit (in Section 2.2) and summarize the game
that participants on both sides of the border played (in Section 3).
2.2 The Udes¸ti Commune: A Brief History
The Udes¸ti Commune is located in the Moldavian region (Suceava County) of northeastern Romania.13 It
is comprised of 11 small villages over approximately 11.04 km2 (Udis¸teanu 2005), ranging from the very
small (Ma˘na˘stioara, which has 23 households), to the largest village Udes¸ti, which has approximately 1,100
households. There is evidence of human inhabitance of Udes¸ti from the Paleolithic and Neolithic eras, and
there has been permanent settlement since at least the late medieval period (Mart¸olea 1986). The largest of
the villages in terms of population and size, Udes¸ti, was formed no later than the 1580s; it was originally a
settlement for corve´e workers of the royal court and other high officials (Mart¸olea 1986, p. 35).
Prior to 1775, the entire Udes¸ti Commune was part of the Bukovina region of Moldavia, a region which
spans parts of modern day Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine. Moldavia fell under indirect Ottoman control
in 1454, although it retained a degree of independence (Inalcik 1973, p. 27). Like other Christian vassal
principalities of the Ottoman Empire (e.g., Wallachia, Transylvania, Dubrovnik, Georgia, and Circassia),
Moldavia was ruled by its own princes as an Ottoman vassal state.
The major event in Udes¸ti history that we exploit in this paper is the partition following the signing of
the Treaty of Ku¨c¸u¨k Kaynarca. Under the terms of this treaty, which ended the Russo-Turkish War in 1774,
the Ottoman Empire ceded Bukovina to the Austrian Habsburg Empire (Udis¸teanu 2005).14 As can be
seen in Figures 1 and 2, the Udes¸ti Commune is located on the border of Bukovina and what would remain
Ottoman Moldavia. The citizens of Bukovina, including those in the Udes¸ti Commune, were required to
take an oath in 1777 to their new Austrian empress Maria Theresa.15
12The “ingroup favoritism” literature is a large and old one in psychology and sociology. Ruﬄe and Sosis (2006) note that
“hundreds of in-group-out-group bias studies fill psychology and sociology journals.” Indeed, this literature is large enough to
have warranted a meta-analysis; see Balliet, Wu, and De Dreu (2014).
13The Udes¸ti Commune was not a commune until the 20th century, but we use this terminology to describe the entire area, as
opposed to the individual village of Udes¸ti.
14The terms of the treaty permitted the Russian Empire to intercede when necessary on behalf of Eastern Orthodox Christians
living in Moldavia.
15The “Oath of Faith to Austria” indicated Austria’s interest in Bukovinan tax revenue, which required legal, judicial, and
administrative apparatuses: “I, Maria Terezia, widow and sovereign empress of the Hungarian Land and of Bukovina, etc. ...
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However, not all Udes¸ti residents were willing to live under Austrian rule. In 1777, one of the major
landowners in the village, Ruxanda S¸tirbet¸, was called to submit an oath in the name of her village, Chilis¸eni,
to the new Austrian rulers (Chilis¸eni is located on the west bank of the Racova Creek, see Figure 2). S¸tirbet¸
refused to participate in the ceremony, which she considered “to be despotic and a crippling of Moldavia”
(Mart¸olea 1986, p. 13). Afterwards, S¸tirbet¸ left her house in Chilis¸eni and moved to a nearly-unoccupied
parcel of land on the opposite side of the creek, which at the time was still part of Chilis¸eni.16 S¸tirbet¸ claimed
that this heretofore unproductive land was still part of Moldavian territory. When brought up before the
before the Austrian Inventory Commission on December 13, 1782, S¸tirbet¸ argued that “the largest part of
Chilis¸eni Village is in Moldavia and [S¸tirbet¸] owns all the estate.” (Mart¸olea 1986, p. 12). Being nearly
uninhabited prior to S¸tirbet¸’s move, there is no evidence one way or the other that it would have been
considered part of Bukovina (and thus ceded to the Austrians) prior to the Treaty of Ku¨c¸u¨k Kaynarca. In
1786, the Austrians recognized S¸tirbet¸’s claim and set a border stone on the right bank of Racova Creek,
between Chilis¸eni and S¸tirbet¸’s new settlement, which would later bear her name, S¸tirba˘t. The Austrians
also placed a border station on the left side of the bank, clearly demarcating Austrian from Moldavian
(Ottoman) territory (Mart¸olea 1986, p. 13).
Soon after S¸tirba˘t was formed, its population grew as families from Bucovina, Transylvania, and Mara-
mures, many of whom viewed themselves as Moldavian, escaped foreign occupation. Some were chased by
Austrian authorities and compelled to return to their lands; others refused and stayed in S¸tirba˘t. In short,
the initial population was comprised mostly of Madame S¸tirbet¸’s corve´e and selectively chosen migrants.17
These migrants tended to be good farmers and animal breeders, and they shortly blended in with the local
population, eventually gaining the right to own their own land. By 1828, there were 43 households in S¸tirba˘t,
and the Moldavian Treasury in 1845 showed 51 households (Mart¸olea 1986, p. 15). Most of the inhabitants
were slaves or corve´e workers until the formation of the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia
in 1859. In 1864, Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza abolished slavery and made peasants landowners (Mart¸olea
1986, p. 53). This contrasts with Austrian Bukovina (i.e., Udes¸ti), where the Austrian government elimi-
nated slavery on the commune immediately after taking control in 1775, issuing a decree permitting serfdom.
Austrian Bukovinan peasants were required to provide 3-6 days a week of unpaid work for the masters of
approach every person who is an inhabitant of Bukovina Districts, who lives here, or who owns lands here, who is our servant,
who pays tribute to us or who is worthy of our protection ... First of all we assure you of our imperial and royal mercy ... For
this, we need no more than for the inhabitants of this district of Bukovina, both the religious and the laic ones and the common
people who live here, to submit their oath and pledge to be our subjects, becoming our obedient taxpayers. Based on this oath,
they pledge to uphold the justice and the order that we instate, agreeing for us to take care of them and always have faith in
us and in the fact that we will always be just and correct with Bukovina district (quoted in Udis¸teanu 2005).”
16According to census taken in 1772-74, this small village, known as La˘t¸canii, contained 9 households consisting of three families,
a priest, and three poor women (Mart¸olea 1986, p. 14).
17Today, S¸tirba˘t still has numerous families whose names are from the Bucovina, Transylvania, and Maramures regions (Mart¸olea
1986, p. 14).
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the estate (Mart¸olea 1986, p. 51). These regulations were relieved in 1835, when a decree by the Emperor
Ferdinand stated that all peasants’ land was henceforth their private property.
The villages in the Udes¸ti Commune under Austrian control (including Udes¸ti and Poieni, two of the
three villages in which we conduct the experiments) remained under Austrian rule until Romania established
control over Bukovina in 1919, following the collapse of Austria-Hungary after World War I. Moldavia
(including S¸tirba˘t) fell under various rulers following the Treaty of Ku¨c¸u¨k Kaynarca. Until the Russo-
Turkish War of 1828-29, it remained under both Ottoman and Russian spheres of influence. After the war,
it fell under Russian domination for three decades until the conclusion of the Crimean War. As part of the
Treaty of Paris (1856) in the aftermath of the Crimean War, Moldavia unified with Wallachia (to its south)
to form the independent state known as The United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The United
Principalities were the predecessor to the Kingdom of Romania (1881-1947), which eventually incorporated
Bukovina in the Treaty of Saint Germain (1919). In 1947, the Kingdom of Romania was proclaimed the
Socialist Republic of Romania, and it remained under one party Communist rule until 1989. In 1950, under
the communist regime, the Udes¸ti Commune was organized as a commune managed by a Popular Council.
On December 24, 1960, an administrative reform placed the Udes¸ti Commune within the Suceava District
(Udis¸teanu 2005, ch. 1).
The upshots of this short history of the Udes¸ti Commune are: i) one village in the commune, S¸tirba˘t,
fell under non-Austrian rule for 144 years (1775-1919), while the rest of the commune, including Udes¸ti and
Poieni, fell under Austrian rule; ii) these differences were not the result of geography, military strategy, or
any of the conventional causes of territorial boundaries, but the predilections of one landowner (Ruxanda
S¸tirbet¸); iii) part of the initial population of S¸tirba˘t was selectively chosen, as it consisted largely of people
escaping Austrian rule for some reason or another; iv) the commune has been reunified for nearly a century
(since 1919), and it has experienced a World War, an extended period under Communist rule, and the
post-Communist era as one commune.
These features combine for an ideal natural experiment to test whether trust norms are transmitted over
generations long after the cessation of the conditions under which those norms formed in the first place. First,
the boundary within the commune between the Austrian and Moldavian side is about as exogenous as one
could hope for, being generated primarily by the predilections of one landowner. Second, these villages fell
under the rule of very different regimes which, as outlined in Section 2.1 and later more formally in Section
4, suggest the possibility that different trust norms were formed over two centuries ago between the villages.
Third, to the extent that selection into non-Austrian S¸tirba˘t (and out of Austrian Udes¸ti and Poieni) existed
in the late-18th century, such selection should affect trust in same direction as the institutional differences
(i.e., residents of S¸tirba˘t should be less trusting of outsiders). As we discuss in greater detail in Section 4,
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this means that we must remain agnostic regarding the root cause of cultural differences (i.e., Ottoman-
Russian-Austrian institutions or selective migration in the 18th century), but it does not undermine our
focus on the persistence of cultural norms. Finally, the villages have been united under the same national
and local governance for nearly a century, meaning that observed differences in trust behavior are not a
result of different experiences with communism or any other post-World War I phenomenon.
For the sake of the experiment, we consider the Austrian side of the border (Udes¸ti and Poieni) to be
“treated” with Austrian institutions from 1774-1919 and outmigration in the late 18th century. This is a
“treatment” because, prior to 1774, all of the villages in question had been under Ottoman rule for over
two centuries. Hence, there was no change in the basic institutional structure of the control village (S¸tirba˘t)
until at least 1859, when the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia formed. Meanwhile, Austrian
institutions prevailed in Udes¸ti and Poieni until 1919. In the following section, we detail the “lab in the
field” experiment designed to exploit this natural experiment.
3 A Lab in the Field on a Natural Experiment: Design and Im-
plementation
3.1 Experiment Design and Instructions
We designed a “lab in the field” experiment to exploit the natural experiment discussed in Section 2.2.
Participants played simple trust games (as in Berg et al. 1995) in one village on the non-Austrian side of the
border, S¸tirba˘t, and two villages on the Austrian side of the border, Udes¸ti and Poieni. Participants played
simplified versions of trust games played hundreds of times in university laboratories.
Participants played the same trust game multiple times. In each game, they were first told the village of
residence of the person they would be matched with. They were then told whether they would be a “sender”
or “receiver”, although these terms were not used (see Appendix B for instructions in English and Appendix
C for instructions translated into Romanian). The exact identity of one’s partner was not known; matches
were randomly determined by a spreadsheet, so even the experimenters did not know the identity of the
matched pairs. Participants were given an incentivized quiz before making their decisions in the first game
in which they participated (see Appendix B.3).
The sender made one decision: how many of three tokens to send over to his or her partner. They made
this decision by simply circling 0, 1, 2, or 3 on a handout provided to them by an experimenter (see Figure
3). Participants were instructed that they would keep any tokens they did not send, while any tokens they
sent would be multiplied by 3 and given to the receiver. Each token was equivalent to 3 Romanian lei, or
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$0.75.
Figure 3: Handout Participants Filled Out to Make the Send Decision
0  1 2 3 
       
Circle one of the above numbers. The number you circle is the amount 
of your 3 tokens you will send to the participant with whom you are 
matched. 
Please only circle one number. If you change your mind, cross out your 
choice and make a new choice. 
Senders were then told that receivers would make a choice of how many of the tokens they received to
return to the sender. Receivers made 3 decisions: how much to return to the sender conditional on the
sender sending 1, 2, or 3 tokens (see Figure 4). If the sender sent 0, there was nothing for the receiver to
return, so we circled “0” for participants. For each of the three decisions, receivers were allowed to circle
any number between 0 and three times the amount sent to them to return to the sender.






1 3 0 1 2 3
2 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Circle a number to return to your partner
Participants first played the game as a sender, matched with a receiver from either their own or another
village, and then played the game as a receiver, matched with a different sender from that village. All
participants played the game at least four times (twice as a sender and twice as a receiver), matched with
co-villagers and outsiders. Instructions were similar, although abbreviated, for receivers. After participants
completed the final treatment they took a short demographic survey (see Appendix B.4 for details).
3.2 Treated and Control Groups
As of July 2016, there were around 1,100 households in (Austrian) Udes¸ti, 270 households in (Austrian)
Poieni, and 300 households in (non-Austrian) S¸tirba˘t. Since Udes¸ti is over three times the size of the other
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two villages, we recruited more subjects from Udes¸ti. In all, there were 200 participants from Udes¸ti and 100
participants from both Poieni and S¸tirba˘t, equaling 400 total participants. Given the unequal numbers from
each of the villages, we augmented the game slightly for participants from each of the villages in a manner
described below.
As described in Section 2, the treated group includes the 300 participants from the Austrian side of the
border (200 from Udes¸ti and 100 from Poieni). These villages were “treated” with Austrian institutions
and outmigration in the late 18th century. Meanwhile, the control group includes the 100 participants from
(non-Austrian) S¸tirba˘t. All participants played the game multiple times. In the first and third games they
played as a sender and in the second and fourth games they played as a receiver. One hundred of the
(Austrian) Udes¸ti participants played two games with people from Udes¸ti and the other two with people
from (non-Austrian) S¸tirba˘t while the other 100 played twice with co-villagers and twice with people from
(Austrian) Poieni. Meanwhile, both the 100 Poieni and 100 S¸tirba˘t participants played two games with
people from all three villages (in the fifth game they acted as sender and in the sixth as receiver, playing
with outgroup participants). To control for order effects, we split each of these groups into two, alternating
the order of game play. For a summary of the order of play see Table 1.
Table 1: Order of Play in the Treated and Control Groups
Village Side of Border Order N
Treated
Udes¸ti Austrian Udes¸ti - S¸tirba˘t 50
Udes¸ti Austrian S¸tirba˘t - Udes¸ti 50
Udes¸ti Austrian Udes¸ti - Poieni 50
Udes¸ti Austrian Poieni - Udes¸ti 50
Poieni Austrian Poieni - Udes¸ti - S¸tirba˘t 50
Poieni Austrian Udes¸ti - Poieni - S¸tirba˘t 50
Control
S¸tirba˘t non-Austrian S¸tirba˘t - Udes¸ti - Poieni 50
S¸tirba˘t non-Austrian Udes¸ti - S¸tirba˘t - Poieni 50
3.3 Experiment Implementation in the Udes¸ti Commune
We employed the Bucharest-based research firm Cult Market Research (CMR) to implement the experiments
on July 21-23, 2016. Six researchers from CMR carried out the experiments in secondary schools, spending
one day in each village. Prior to conducting the experiments, CMR made local contacts to serve as field
recruiters: 3 in Udes¸ti, 1 in Poieni, and 1 in S¸tirba˘t. These contacts were all well-known in their village and
were introduced to CMR by the mayor. The field recruiters worked with two CMR researchers to organize
the experiment (e.g., find a location) and sign up participants one week prior to implementation. The
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popularity of the field recruiters is one of the primary reasons we were able to achieve such high turnout for
the experiment. And, luckily, the weather was beautiful the three days CMR conducted the experiment.18
Importantly, CMR was never informed about the natural experiment this paper exploits. We had many
discussions with the CMR researchers regarding the implementation of the experiment, the villages involved,
and the manner in which they would collect and input data, but we never discussed the old Austrian border
central to our identification strategy. Hence, the experiment was double-blind, with neither participants nor
experimenters knowing the research questions.
CMR conducted the experiment with 20-30 participants at a time, all playing the same treatment. In-
structions were read aloud in Romanian, and all instructions and handouts were translated into Romanian.
About 50% of participants needed additional explanations for at least one of the tasks, although all partici-
pants also took a quiz to test their understanding. Participants largely followed instructions and were silent
during the experiment except when asking questions. Each session took about one hour to complete.
On the day of the experiment, participants received a 10 lei ($2.50) show-up fee, paid before the experi-
ment began (to engender the belief that participants would indeed be paid). They were told that they could
make much more during the experiment, and that in one week a representative of CMR would come back to
the village to pay their earnings (beyond the show-up fee). After the experiment was conducted, the CMR
researchers entered the data into a de-identified spreadsheet, which returned how much each participant
earned in the experiment (participants were identified by a number, and CMR kept a separate spreadsheet
that matched participants’ names to their ID number). A CMR researcher returned one week later to pay
participants their earnings. We unfortunately could not pay subjects their earnings immediately because
payouts were contingent on decisions made in other villages.
4 Testable Predictions
Before proceeding to the experimental results, we propose numerous predictions regarding the actions of the
participants. We do not propose a formal model in this section because the intuition for our predictions is
taken from the literature and is straight-forward. We therefore do not need a model to generate unexpected or
counter-intuitive predictions. We begin by listing predictions with respect to expected behavioral differences
and proceed to provide predictions that would hold true if the mechanism is inter-generational cultural
transmission.
First, we employ the literature on Austrian-Ottoman/Russian institutional differences overviewed in
18It is possible that field recruiters may have induced selectivity into the subject pool if, for example, one was less trusting of
outsiders than the others. Even though we have no reason to believe this was the case, we cannot rule it out. However, we note
that a non-trivial share of the entire village in each of the three villages participated in the experiment, limiting the effect that
recruiter selection could have on the results.
15
Section 2.1. This literature helps us generate predictions regarding the actions of participants on either
side of the old border conditional on these differences being manifested to some degree today (possibly
through inter-generational cultural transmission, which we turn to shortly). This literature suggests that
the Austrian administration was relatively decentralized, efficient, well-respected, and free from corruption,
while Ottoman and Russian administration was rapacious and predatory, extracting the maximum rents
possible. It follows that people living in the Austrian lands should have had greater trust in government
(Becker et al. 2016). Importantly, this type of trust was not generated by social ties or local norms. Instead,
it was generated by those outside of one’s social group, especially on the non-Austrian side of the border,
where administrators’ ties to the local community were often weak. This is a key distinction, because trust
outside of one’s social group is difficult to generate (Balliet, Wu, and De Dreu 2014), but it is one of the keys
to facilitating impersonal exchange (Arrow 1972; Greif 1994, 2006).19 We therefore expect that, if norms
generated by institutional differences in the 18th-19th century are “sticky” enough to still exist, people
whose village was “treated” with Austrian institutions would trust outsiders more than people living on the
non-Austrian side.20
Moreover, Section 2.2 suggests that there may have been selection into non-Austrian S¸tirba˘t and out of
Austrian Udes¸ti in the late-18th century. Many migrants into S¸tirba˘t were native Moldavians escaping some
form of repression in the recently-annexed Bukovina territory. With respect to trust attitudes, it follows that
these migrants should have been more trusting of the people in the location they escaped to (S¸tirba˘t) and
less trusting of people in places they escaped from (Udes¸ti). On the one hand, this fact muddles the proposed
causal pathway, since the initial impetus causing differences in contemporary trust could be old Austrian-
Ottoman-Russian institutional differences, late-18th century selection into non-Austrian S¸tirba˘t, or (likely)
some combination of the two. There is no way of separating these competing causes, and we remain agnostic
regarding which one is the driving force. However, the key question addressed in this paper is whether
cultural differences generated long ago persist, whatever their origin. On this front, we are fortunate that
selection into S¸tirba˘t yields the same prediction regarding trust of outsiders as do differences in Austrian and
non-Austrian administration. Regardless of the initial cause of cross-border cultural differences, evidence of
contemporary effects would indicate strong persistence.
19Becker et al. (2016) find no differences in either side of the old Austrian border on interpersonal trust in general. Their data
do not allow them to speak to the outgroup-ingroup distinction we make in this paper.
20We cannot completely rule out the possibility that our experiment picks up trust (or mistrust) of people from the specific
“outsider” village in question, rather than trust or mistrust of outsiders in general. Likewise, we cannot completely rule out
the possibility that our results are reflective of different family structures across villages, which have been shown elsewhere
to be tied to distrust of outsiders (Alesina and Giuliano 2014; Greif and Tabellini 2017; Enke 2017). Yet, the benefit of the
natural experiment we exploit is that the salient difference across the villages was the political state in power. There is little
reason to believe there are fundamentally different family structures across villages. Indeed, the founder of (non-Austrian)
S¸tirba˘t (Madame Ruxanda S¸tirbet¸) and her family had lived on the Austrian side of the border for at least a century before
the partition (Mart¸olea 1986, p. 12).
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In the context of the trust game experiment, administrative differences and selection into non-Austrian
S¸tirba˘t therefore yield the following prediction:
Prediction 1: Participants from the control village (non-Austrian S¸tirba˘t) will send less when playing the
game with outsiders than will participants from the treated villages (Udes¸ti and Poieni).
Within the treated villages, there will be no difference in the amount sent to outsiders.
The prediction with respect to how much one sends to co-villagers is not as straight-forward, as there
are two countervailing factors at play. On the one hand, if people from the Austrian side are simply more
trusting of others in general, including people from their own village, they should send more to co-villagers
than people from the non-Austrian side. On the other hand, lower trust of outsiders on the non-Austrian
side (Prediction 1) may have made intravillage trust all the more important, as the possibilities for exchange
outside the village would have been lower (Greif 1994). If this effect is strong, it would entail that people on
the non-Austrian side are more likely to trust co-villagers. Since it is unclear ex ante which effect is stronger
and our experiment does not allow us to parse trust into these two countervailing effects, we do not make
predictions with respect to trust of co-villagers. We can, however, make a statement about relative trust: i.e.,
how trusting people are of co-villagers relative to outsiders. The above discussion suggests that people from
the non-Austrian side may be more trusting of co-villagers than people from the Austrian side, in which case
(in combination with Prediction 1) the difference in trust between co-villagers and outsiders would be greater
on the non-Austrian side. Yet, even if people from the non-Austrian side are less trusting of co-villagers
because their general level of trust is lower, if this is at all counteracted by historic exchange opportunities,
the difference in trust between co-villagers and outsiders should still be greater on the non-Austrian side, all
else equal. In the context of the experiment, this insight yields the following prediction:
Prediction 2: The difference in the amount sent when playing the game with co-villagers versus outsiders
will be greater for participants from the control village (non-Austrian S¸tirba˘t) than those
from the treated villages (Udes¸ti and Poieni).
Next, we turn to the “return” decision made in the second stage of the trust game. The return decision
does not measure trust. Instead, it measures trustworthiness; the receiver rewards a sender for trusting them,
and they will have no further interaction nor will they ever know each other’s identities. Trustworthiness
is different from trust because it is conditional ; it is only expressed when the other person exhibits trust
in the first place. Nothing we know of in the Austrian-Ottoman-Russian literature sheds light on whether
we should expect to see stronger trustworthiness from participants on one side of the border. Hence, we
do not make a prediction with respect to the return decision. But these decisions are still important for
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our interpretation of the send decision. As Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) note, a sender could rationally
mistrust the other group if participants from the other group are indeed likely to return less on average.
This yields an interpretation that players are simply acting rationally, and that “statistical discrimination”
may be an optimal strategy in the absence of other information. Hence, in the analysis we will note whether
there is any evidence for rational statistical discrimination.
Finally, we turn to the cultural transmission mechanism. The most commonly accepted mechanism in
the economics literature is the one proposed by Bisin and Verdier (2001), in which parents transmit their
preferences to their children as a form of “parental altruism” (also see Nunn and Wantchekon 2011; Dohmen
et al. 2012; Giuliano and Nunn 2017; Bisin and Verdier 2017; Iyigun and Rubin 2017; Roland and Yang
2017). This type of cultural transmission is denoted as vertical transmission (i.e., from parent to child).
These preferences may also spread through the population either horizontally via peer group or obliquely
via teaching (Bisin and Verdier 2008; Tabellini 2008; Guiso et al. 2008). Indeed, preferences may not even
be transmitted directly from parent to child; transmission from one generation to the next can occur if
children randomly sample the preferences of individuals from the older generation and take the average as
their own preference (Boyd and Richerson 1985). While we cannot speak to the exact mechanism, given
the simplicity of our experiment, our questionnaire does allow us to test an implication of the Bisin and
Verdier model.21 If cultural transmission occurred in the villages, people whose families have lived in the
village for multiple generations should be more likely to have the cultural traits predicted in Predictions 1
and 2.22 To test this conjecture, the questionnaire administered after the experiment asked participants how
long their families have lived in the village in question. While we arbitrarily set the cut-off in Prediction 3
at whether one’s grandparents are from the village, we also test whether this prediction holds with respect
to great-grandparents (results are reported in the Appendix).
Prediction 3: If cultural transmission occurred in the villages in the study, Predictions 1 and 2 should hold
more strongly for participants whose grandparents (and previous generations) are from the
village.
21We cannot speak directly to the idea that trust behavior is vertical transmitted via genetics. For instance, Cesarini et al. (2008)
find that about half of variation in trust game behavior arises from genetic variation. Yet, the results we present in Section 5
indicate that it is not trust in general that differs by village but trust of outsiders. This finding is difficult to reconcile with a
purely genetic view.
22Our questionnaire obtains family information via the question “To your knowledge, how long has your family lived in [village]?”
(Question #7, available in Appendix B.4). The possible answers are “You moved to [village] during your lifetime,” “Your
parents moved to [village],” “Your grandparents moved to [village],” “Your great-grandparents or an older generation moved to
[village],” and “I don’t know.” We recognize that different subjects could take this question differently (i.e., some may answer
“grandparents” if one grandparent is from the village while others may answer only if all four are). While this is a possibility,
there is little reason why the propensity to answer in one way or another would differ across the three villages in question.
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5 Results
5.1 Demographic Summary Statistics
Before presenting the results of the experiment, we present balance tests across the treatment and control
groups on basic demographic characteristics, derived from the survey administered after the experiment. The
results are summarized in Table 2. Such balance is important; Alesina and la Ferrara (2002) suggest that
poor educational or occupational outcomes (among other things) are associated with low trust. Hence, if our
participant sample is skewed, it might be these demographic features driving any treatment differences we
find, not “cultural” differences. Fortunately, our sample is mostly balanced. Around half of the participants
were female in both the (Austrian) treatment and (non-Austrian) control groups. Likewise, there are no
statistically significant differences between the average age or education level between participants within the
treated and control groups. The average age in all three villages is in the mid-40s, around half of participants
have a high school education. While an overwhelming majority of participants in all three villages are Eastern
Orthodox, the proportion is higher in S¸tirba˘t than in the treated villages (0.88 vs. 0.96, p = 0.023).23 The
other demographic characteristic that is statistically different between the treated and control groups is
marital status. More participants in the treated group are married (0.65) than in the control village S¸tirba˘t
(0.53).
Table 2: Summary Statistics, Demographics
High School Eastern
Side of Border Female Age Married or Above Orthodox
Austrian 0.53 45.91 0.65 0.51 0.88
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.03) (1.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
N = 300 N = 279 N = 298 N = 295 N = 296
Non-Austrian 0.52 43.01 0.53 0.45 0.96
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.05) (2.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
N = 100 N = 94 N = 98 N = 94 N = 97
p-value: Diff in Means 0.863 0.153 0.033* 0.273 0.023*
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
For the sake of a trust experiment, it is also desirable to have balance across occupations. It is possible
that past institutional differences affect income or occupational mobility in the present, which itself could
affect trust norms. To address this possibility, we report in Table 3 the participants’ self-reported occupation.
23Importantly, the villages in the Udes¸ti commune have been overwhelmingly Eastern Orthodox since the time of the partition
in 1774. Indeed, one of the first things Madame S¸tirbet¸ did (in 1781) upon moving to the new village of S¸tirba˘t was have a
church built (Mart¸olea 1986, p. 12)
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This is our best indication of participants’ economic status. While the unemployed (including housewives,
house-husbands, retirees, and students) are over-represented, likely due to the nature of recruiting for a field
experiment, there are no statistically significant differences in any of the set of occupations.
Table 3: Summary Statistics, Occupations
Side of Border Housewife Student Retired Unemployed Agric Service Blue Collar
Austrian 0.26 0.09 0.24 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.13
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
N = 284
Non-Austrian 0.28 0.13 0.24 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.12
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
N = 90
p-value: Diff in Means 0.697 0.210 0.977 0.717 0.093 0.738 0.842
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
“Housewife” includes housewives, househusbands, and those raising children. “Unemployed” includes self-identified unemployed
and those who list job as “none”. “Agriculture” includes agriculturalists, farmers, daysmen, and cattlemen. “Service” includes
clothiers, sellers, drivers, personal assistants, bakers, caretakers, postal workers, teachers, city hall workers, freelancers, poets,
partners, administrators, athletes, interior designers, postal workers, clerks, librarians, treasurers, and one economist. “Blue
collar” includes those in construction, “workers,” technicians, plumbers, car washers, mechanics, steel workers, security agents,
and chambermaids. Four participants listed jobs we could not classify.
The theory laid out in Section 4 is based on cultural transmission. In particular, Prediction 3 indicates
that outgroup trust should be different for those whose grandparents are from the village than for those
whose grandparents are not. This argument is based on cultural transmission, not some other demographic
detail that might differ between the two groups. Take, for instance, education or religion. It is possible that
the centuries-old institutional differences noted in previous sections affect one’s education or religion in the
present, and it is education or religion in the present that affects trust, not “culture” (as in Alesina and la
Ferrara 2002). In other words, what we are ascribing to culture may actually be mediated through some
other educational or demographic feature. To address this possibility, we report in Table 4 the demographic
summary statistics broken down by whether or not one’s grandparents are from the village. The reported
p-values are intra-village comparisons between those whose grandparents are and are not from the village.
These results suggest that, within villages, participants whose grandparents are from the village are statis-
tically similar to those whose grandparents are not from the village. This indicates that any results we find
are unlikely to arise from mediation via some other channel. The one difference of potential concern is that
participants from (non-Austrian) S¸tirba˘t whose grandparents are from S¸tirba˘t have higher education than
those whose grandparents are not from S¸tirba˘t. This, however, should work against our hypotheses, which
suggest that participants of S¸tirba˘t should be less trusting of outsiders. The standard result in the literature
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(Alesina and la Ferrara 2002) is that more education leads to greater trust, thus biasing against us finding
lower trust in S¸tirba˘t.
Table 4: Demographic Summary Statistics, by History in Village
High School Eastern
Female Age Married or Above Orthodox
Grandparents
from Village? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Austrian 0.55 0.58 46.85 45.28 0.57 0.66 0.53 0.57 0.90 0.86
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.05) (0.05) (1.76) (1.60) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
N 112 119 107 109 111 119 109 118 111 118
p-value: Diff in Means 0.688 0.521 0.134 0.590 0.300
Non-Austrian 0.56 0.58 36.72 43.65 0.44 0.51 0.63 0.35 1.00 0.93
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.10) (0.08) (3.79) (3.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.00) (0.04)
N 27 43 25 43 27 43 27 43 27 43
p-value: Diff in Means 0.833 0.169 0.587 0.023* 0.164
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values are within village differences, taken from Wilcoxon
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
Finally, we examine the degree to which participants trust others. The results are summarized in Table
5. We asked participants to rate how much they trust people in each of the three villages (from 1-5, with
1 being extremely untrustworthy and 5 being extremely trustworthy; see Appendix B.4 for details).24 Not
surprisingly, participants tended to find people from their own village more trustworthy. Participants from
both Austrian Udes¸ti and Poieni view people from non-Austrian S¸tirba˘t as less trustworthy than their co-
villagers while participants from S¸tirba˘t viewed their co-villagers as more trustworthy than people from
Udes¸ti and Poieni.25 Yet, participants from the treated and control villages found their co-villagers about
equally trustworthy (3.73 vs. 3.74) while also finding people from the opposite side of the old border equally
(less) trustworthy.26 Within the treated group, it appears that participants from (Austrian) Udes¸ti and
24We asked more questions in the survey about trust in others and unofficial payments (i.e., bribes) one has to make to secure a
variety of public goods. The results, reported in Appendix Table A1, suggest that 2/3 of subjects felt they could trust others,
and few regularly had to pay bribes. Although there are no statistically significant differences in trust between the treatment
and control villages, the question does not ask about in-group vs. out-group, but about trust in general. We also asked questions
about participants’ financial history (i.e., borrowing and lending). The averages are reported in Appendix Table A2. The only
statistically significant finding is that participants from S¸tirba˘t borrowed and lent more frequently to co-villagers than those
from the treated villages.
25In the remainder of the paper, including Table 5, we use the term “outsider” simply to refer to those that live within the Udes¸ti
commune but not within one’s village. Our experiment does not permit us to test participants’ trust of outsiders in general.
26In Appendix Table A3, we report the fraction of participants who answered each quiz question correctly as well as their average
earnings from the experiment. These results are mixed. Participants from S¸tirba˘t correctly answered questions 1 and 2 more
often than those from the Austrian villages, but the latter correctly answered questions 5 and 6 more frequently than the
former. In general, participants from all three villages answered nearly 2/3 of questions correctly on average. Although some
participants did not do well on the quiz, we did not impose a threshold for playing. We do, however, control for their quiz score
in the empirical analysis. Participants from Udes¸ti only played four rounds of the experiment, versus six rounds for participants
from Poieni and S¸tirba˘t, and thus their earnings are not directly comparable. Participants in Poieni and S¸tirba˘t earned nearly
the same amount ($18.21 vs. $18.34).
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Poieni trust each other approximately the same, while trusting people from (non-Austrian) S¸tirba˘t less.27
This suggests the possibility that people on the opposite sides of the old border still consider each other
“outsiders”. However, it is important to note that these are the results of a non-incentivized survey, taken
after participants played a variety of trust games. Hence, their responses may be affected by the game itself
or their expectations of what the experimenters desired (given that they just played a trust game). We
therefore focus on the incentivized trust games in the remainder of the analysis.
Table 5: Summary Statistics, Trust Others
Trust Trust Trust Trust
Side of Border Co-villagers (1-5) Udes¸ti (1-5) Poieni (1-5) S¸tirba˘t (1-5)
Austrian 3.73 3.74 3.71 3.48
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
N = 280 N = 281 N = 284 N = 281
Non-Austrian 3.74 3.54 3.53 3.74
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
N = 94 N = 93 N = 94 N = 94
p-value: Diff in Means 0.595 0.068 0.121 0.002**
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
5.2 Trust: The Send Decision
Prediction 1 indicates that participants from the control village (non-Austrian) S¸tirba˘t will send less tokens
than participants from the treated, Austrian villages (Udes¸ti and Poieni) when matched with outsiders.
Meanwhile, Prediction 2 indicates that the difference in the amount sent to one’s co-villagers versus out-
siders should be greater in the control village (S¸tirba˘t) than in the treated, Austrian villages. Moreover, if
intra-family, vertical cultural transmission is among the mechanisms connecting historically-derived cultural
differences with contemporary trust norms, we expect these effects to be stronger for participants whose
grandparents lived in their village (Prediction 3).28 Table 6 and Figure 5 report the results.
Figure 5 shows the average amount sent to one’s co-villagers (column 1), sent to outsiders (column 2),
and the fraction of participants who sent more to their co-villagers than to outsiders (column 3). The second
and third rows break down these results by whether one’s grandparents are from the village or not.29 While
27The average trust of people from Poieni by participants from Udes¸ti is 3.66 while the average trust of people from Udes¸ti by
participants from Poieni is 3.76.
28Appendix Table A5 provides the same information as Panel A of Table 6, but with the data broken down by whether one’s
great-grandparents are from the village or not. Results are similar to those reported in Table 6.
29The incentivized results reported in Table 6 show similar patterns to the self-reported levels of trust (see Table 5) when
broken down by whether or not the participant’s grandparent is from the village, although the inter-village differences are not
statistically significant. These results are available upon request.
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breaking down results by family lineage does reduce the size of the samples, it comes with the benefit of
permitting a test of Prediction 3, even if this test is somewhat underpowered.30




















































Consider first Prediction 1, which appears contradicted by the amount sent by all participants in the
treated vs. control groups. The average amount sent to outsiders in the treated (Austrian) villages (1.86) is
similar to the amount sent to outsiders in the control (non-Austrian) village (1.85; p = 0.796). However, par-
ticipants from S¸tirba˘t whose grandparents are from S¸tirba˘t send much less to outsiders than do participants
from the treated villages whose grandparents are from the village (1.94 vs. 1.48; p = 0.007). Meanwhile,
30Unfortunately, the issue of the tests being underpowered is a reflection of just how small these villages are. In S¸tirba˘t and
Poieni, around 1/3 of all households in the village participated in our experiment, while in Udes¸ti, around 1/5 of households
participated. Thus, slicing the sample along any dimension creates a danger of an underpowered test. This lack of power is
exacerbated when the treated villages are unpooled. Nonetheless, we report these results in Appendix Table A4. In terms of
statistical significance, these results are broadly similar to those reported in Table 6.
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Table 6: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders
Sent More to
Sent to Co-villagers Sent to Outsiders Co-villagers (0/1)
Grandparents Grandparents Grandparents
from Village? from Village? from Village?
All Yes No All Yes No All Yes No
A. Treated (Austrian) vs. Control (Non-Austrian)
Austrian 1.99 2.06 1.94 1.86 1.94 1.83 0.32 0.35 0.30
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
N 298 111 118 294 108 118 292 107 117
Non-Austrian 2.16 2.04 2.30 1.85 1.48 1.98 0.43 0.59 0.44
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08)
N 100 27 43 100 27 43 100 27 43
p-value: Diff in Means 0.079 0.842 0.013* 0.796 0.007** 0.317 0.044* 0.020* 0.092
B. Small Villages
Austrian 2.04 2.19 1.94 1.67 1.72 1.71 0.43 0.44 0.40
(Poieni) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
N 100 37 48 99 36 48 99 36 48
Non-Austrian 2.16 2.04 2.30 1.55 1.33 1.56 0.51 0.52 0.56
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.09) (0.20) (0.12) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08)
N 100 27 43 100 27 43 100 27 43
p-value: Diff in Means 0.392 0.400 0.036* 0.322 0.100 0.335 0.286 0.563 0.124
C. Treated Villages
Austrian 1.97 2.00 1.94 1.91 2.03 1.86 0.31 0.30 0.30
(Udes¸ti) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
N 198 74 70 195 72 70 193 71 69
Austrian 2.04 2.19 1.94 1.76 1.75 1.79 0.34 0.44 0.29
(Poieni) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
N 100 37 48 99 36 48 99 36 48
p-value: Diff in Means 0.380 0.145 0.947 0.199 0.089 0.785 0.513 0.128 0.883
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. Sent
More to Co-villagers = 1 if participant sent more to co-villagers than to outsiders. In the panels A and C, outsiders are defined
as the other village one played with in the first four rounds. In panel B, outsiders are defined as the other village one played
with in the final two rounds.
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there is no statistically significant difference in the amount sent to outsiders across villages among partici-
pants whose grandparents are not from the village (1.83 vs. 1.98; p = 0.317). In fact, within this group the
average amount sent is larger for participants from (non-Austrian) S¸tirba˘t.
One confounding factor in our analysis is that one of the villages in the treated group, Udes¸ti, is larger
than the other two villages (1,100 househoulds vs. around 300 households in the other two villages). We
address this issue in panel B of Table 6, which compares only the two smallest villages, Poieni and S¸tirba˘t.
While this comparison lacks power, the results with respect to the amount sent to outsiders is similar to
those reported in panel A. Comparing the final two rounds of play (in which participants from S¸tirba˘t played
with those from Poieni and vice versa), we find that participants from the two villages send a similar amount
to outsiders (1.67 vs. 1.55; p = 0.322). However, among those with a grandparent from the village, those
from the control village (S¸tirba˘t) send much less than those from the treated village (1.72 vs. 1.33; p =
0.100).
Finally, in panel C of Table 6, we compare the two treated villages. According to Prediction 1, we should
not see differences in sending behavior across these villages. Indeed, with respect to the amount sent to
outsiders, this is broadly what we find (1.91 vs. 1.76; p = 0.199). While there does appear to be a difference
among those whose grandparents are from the village (2.03 vs. 1.75; p = 0.089), these amounts remain much
larger than in the control village (1.48).
Hence, after accounting for family ties within the village, the experiment results lend support to Predic-
tions 1 and 3. We summarize these results as follows:
Result 1: Participants from the control village (S¸tirba˘t) whose grandparents are from S¸tirba˘t send less
when playing with outsiders than do participants from the treated (Austrian) villages whose
grandparents are from the village.
Prediction 2 states that the amount sent to one’s co-villagers relative to the amount sent to outsiders
should be greater in the control village (non-Austrian S¸tirba˘t) than in the treated, Austrian villages. To
test this prediction, the third column of Figure 5 reports the fraction of participants who sent more to
co-villagers than to outsiders.31 As suggested by Prediction 2, a greater fraction of participants from the
control (non-Austrian) village send more to their co-villagers than participants from the treated (Austrian)
villages (0.32 vs. 0.43; p = 0.044). This is true whether or not one’s grandparents are from the village,
although for different reasons. Among participants whose grandparents are not from the village, those from
(non-Austrian) S¸tirba˘t send much more to their co-villagers than do those from the treated villages (1.94
31We also analyzed the difference in the total amount sent to co-villagers and outsiders. All results are similar in terms of
statistical significance to the results pertaining to the fraction of participants who sent more to co-villagers than to outsiders.
For the sake of brevity we do not include these statistics.
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vs. 2.30; p = 0.013). We will return to this observation shortly. Meanwhile, among participants whose
grandparents are from the village, Result 1 noted that those from S¸tirba˘t send much less to outsiders than
do those from the two treated villages. These results are summarized as follows:
Result 2: Participants from the control village (S¸tirba˘t) are more likely to send more to their co-villagers
than to outsiders than participants from the treated (Austrian) villages.
Finally, we address a possible explanation for the finding that, among participants whose grandparents
are not from the village, those from the control village (non-Austrian S¸tirba˘t) send more to their co-villagers
than do those from the treated, Austrian villages. One possible explanation is that newcomers selectively
chose the village in which they currently reside. That is, if they chose to live in their current village because
they found people in that village to be particularly trustworthy, they may send more to co-villagers than
those whose families have lived there multiple generations. And, if people from S¸tirba˘t are indeed particularly
trustworthy, at least with respect to their co-villagers, this selection effect could contribute to our finding.
To address this possibility, we run ordered probit regressions on the amount participants sent to co-
villagers and outsiders, controlling for numerous individual characteristics.32 We also control for order
effects,33 the participant’s quiz score, and demographic controls including a gender dummy, age, age squared,
marital status, a high school education dummy, an Eastern Orthodox dummy, religiosity, and occupational
status. The results are reported in Table 7.34
The results are broadly consistent with what we find in the comparison of means. There does not
appear to be a “S¸tirba˘t effect” in the amount sent to outsiders (columns (3)-(4)), although subjects whose
grandparents are from S¸tirba˘t send significantly less to outsiders (consistent with Result 1). There does
appear to be a “S¸tirba˘t effect” with respect to the amount sent to co-villagers: the S¸tirba˘t dummy coefficient
is positive and statistically significant in specification (2). The coefficient on the “Grandparents from Village
* S¸tirba˘t” interaction term indicates that this effect may be driven by subjects whose grandparents are not
from the village, although this coefficient is not statistically significant. In other words, while we find a
“S¸tirba˘t effect”—participants from S¸tirba˘t send more to their co-villagers than do those from the treated
villages—we cannot say with statistical precision that this effect is confined to those who do or do not have
a grandparent from the village.
These results raise the question: why is there a “S¸tirba˘t effect” in the amount sent to one’s co-villagers
that transcends one’s family’s ties to the village? Such an effect would be consistent with people from S¸tirba˘t
32Linear probability model estimates are similar in terms of statistical significance. These results are available upon request.
33The order of game play is statistically significant in many of the specifications, consistent with decay found in repeated economic
experiments.
34In Appendix Table A6 we include potentially endogenous regressors, i.e., those related to trust. Results are broadly similar
to the ones reported in Table 7. There is a reduced sample size in Table 7 because not all participants knew whether their
grandparents came from the village, and a few participants failed to answer the survey question.
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Table 7: Ordered Probit Regressions: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Sent to Co-villagers Sent to Outsiders
S¸tirba˘t Dummy 0.26 0.44* 0.10 0.33
(0.15) (0.22) (0.15) (0.21)
Grandparents from 0.11 0.12
Village Dummy (0.16) (0.16)
Grandparents from -0.45 -0.91**
Village * S¸tirba˘t (0.34) (0.34)
Order: Own First -0.26 -0.13 -0.51** -0.38*
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15)
Know Someone 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.03
From Other Village (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17)
N 336 264 332 260
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
QUIZ SCORE YES YES YES YES
DEMOGRAPHIC YES YES YES YES
Notes: Ordered probit coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Quiz Score is number
correct out of 6 on incentivized quiz. Demographic characteristics are a gender dummy, age, age squared, married dummy, high
school education dummy, Eastern Orthodox dummy, dummy for whether subjects attend religious services, and dummies for
occupation type (not employed, blue collar, agriculture, service, and other). Outsiders are defined as the outside village one
played with in the first four rounds.
being more trustworthy ; i.e., more likely to return tokens to their co-villagers. We address this question in
the following section by analyzing the participants’ return decisions.
5.3 Trustworthiness: The Return Decision
In Section 4, we made no predictions regarding the return decision. Yet, these results may shed light on
the “S¸tirba˘t effect” from Result 2, namely that participants from (non-Austrian) S¸tirba˘t send more to their
co-villagers than do those from the treated, Austrian villages regardless of their family history in the village.
If people from S¸tirba˘t are indeed more trustworthy (i.e., they return more conditional on the amount sent),
their fellow villagers could know this and accordingly send more to their co-villagers, regardless of how long
their family lived in the village. Such a choice would be rational “statistical discrimination,” as discussed in
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001).
To this end, we analyze the amount returned to co-villagers and outsiders conditional on the sender
they were matched with sending 1, 2, or 3 tokens. The results are summarized in Table 8 and Figure
6.35 These results indicate that rational, statistical discrimination can explain at least part of the “S¸tirba˘t
35Appendix Table A7 provides the same information as Table 8, but with the data broken down by whether one’s great-
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effect”. Participants from S¸tirba˘t returned more to co-villagers than those from the treated, Austrian villages
conditional on being sent 2 tokens (3.36 vs. 3.65; p = 0.052) and conditional on being sent 3 tokens (4.82
vs. 5.26; p = 0.128). Although statistically imprecise, this indicates that it is rational for participants from
S¸tirba˘t to send more to their co-villagers.
Table 8: Average Amount Returned to Co-villagers and Outsiders
If Sent 1 If Sent 2 If Sent 3
Grandparents Grandparents Grandparents
from Village? from Village? from Village?
All Yes No All Yes No All Yes No
Returned to Co-villagers
Austrian 2.00 1.87 2.08 3.36 3.30 3.43 4.82 4.90 4.91
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.21)
N 297 110 119 295 109 119 292 108 118
Non-Austrian 2.00 1.96 2.05 3.65 3.48 3.60 5.26 4.85 5.28
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.08) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16) (0.36) (0.25) (0.24) (0.49) (0.32)
N 99 27 43 98 27 42 99 27 43
p-value: Diff in Means 0.964 0.661 0.710 0.052 0.627 0.436 0.128 0.813 0.342
Returned to Outsiders
Austrian 1.78 1.80 1.76 3.24 3.17 3.30 4.71 4.67 4.81
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.20) (0.21)
N 298 111 118 297 110 118 294 108 118
Non-Austrian 1.92 1.69 1.90 3.52 2.92 3.62 5.26 4.19 5.22
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.09) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.30) (0.25) (0.26) (0.50) (0.37)
N 96 26 41 97 26 42 97 27 41
p-value: Diff in Means 0.117 0.445 0.295 0.130 0.345 0.261 0.047* 0.345 0.357
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
Likewise, trustworthiness may provide an explanation for why people whose grandparents are from non-
Austrian S¸tirba˘t send less to outsiders than people whose grandparents are from the treated, Austrian villages
(Result 1). The average amounts returned to outsiders conditional on the amount sent are summarized in
the bottom panel of Table 8. The results indicate that participants from S¸tirba˘t do indeed return more to
outsiders than those from the treated villages conditional on being sent 2 tokens (3.24 vs. 3.52; p = 0.130)
and conditional on being sent 3 tokens (4.71 vs. 5.26; p = 0.047). However, these results are not driven
by participants whose grandparents are from the village. There is no statistically significant difference in
the amount returned between the two villages among participants whose grandparents are from the village;
if anything, those from S¸tirba˘t return less. Moreover, within S¸tirba˘t, participants whose grandparents are
from the village return less than those whose grandparents are not from the village conditional on being sent
grandparents are from the village or not. Results are similar to those reported in Table 8
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2 tokens (2.92 vs. 3.62; p = 0.052) or 3 tokens (4.19 vs. 5.22; p = 0.111). Meanwhile, within the treated
villages, participants whose grandparents are from the village return a statistically indistinguishable amount
from those whose grandparents are not from the village conditional on being sent 2 tokens (3.17 vs. 3.30; p
= 0.320) or 3 tokens (4.67 vs. 4.81; p = 0.622).
These results make it difficult to reconcile Result 1 with a purely “statistical discrimination” viewpoint.
Such an explanation would require participants whose grandparents are from the treated, Austrian villages
believing that outsiders will return more than those whose grandparents are from the control village. Even
though this is correct, this result is driven by participants whose grandparents are not from the village in
question. Hence, while it is possible that the presence of statistical discrimination is a reflection of cultural
differences generated by the old Austrian border, the most likely explanation for Result 1 remains that
outgroup trust—rational or not—is weaker on the non-Austrian side of the border. These findings are
summarized as follows:
Result 4: Participants in the treated (Austrian) villages return less to both co-villagers and outsiders than
do those from the control (non-Austrian) village. There are no statistically significant differences
in the amount returned between the treated and control villages when the sample is split between
those whose grandparents are and are not from the village.
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6 Conclusion
This paper takes advantage of a natural experiment to shed light on whether norms derived from historical
circumstances persist in the long run. We run a “lab in the field” trust game experiment in three villages
in northeastern Romania, which were on opposite sides of the old Austrian border for over a century for
arbitrary, idiosyncratic reasons. The arbitrariness of the border placement in combination with the well-
known differences in Austrian and Ottoman/Russian institutions and centuries-old migration patterns makes
this an ideal environment to test whether cultural norms that arose due to historical reasons persist in the long
run. Ottoman and Russian administrative institutions were famously rapacious and harmful to commerce,
and the literature suggests this eroded trust in government in the former Ottoman/Russian lands. Meanwhile,
villages “treated” with the relatively efficient and corruption-free Austrian administration were potentially
motivated to trust outsiders—all three empires were outsiders to Romanians. We hypothesize that these
historical differences should have fostered the emergence of different trust norms in the two regions, with
people on the “treated” Austrian side of the border being more trusting of outsiders. We further hypothesize
that, if trust norms are indeed passed on inter-generationally (i.e., vertically), these inter-village differences
should be most apparent among participants whose grandparents are from the village. Their grandparents
would have lived, or lived with people who lived, while the border differences existed, and thus possibly
would have been imbued with these cultural attributes at an early age.
Our results confirm most of these hypotheses. Most strikingly, when participants played the game with
outsiders, there was no difference between the treated and control villages in the amount sent. However,
focusing on the overall average masks significant heterogeneity within the village: while there were no
differences in the amount sent by people whose grandparents were not from their home village, people whose
grandparents grew up in the village on the treated (Austrian) side sent significantly more to outsiders than
people whose grandparents grew up in the control (non-Austrian) side.
While these results permit alternative hypotheses—perhaps people whose grandparents are from this
one village in northeastern Romania are just less trusting of outsiders for some idiosyncratic reason besides
cultural transmission—our methodology and the complementary literature suggest that these results are
indeed reflective of the cultural transmission of norms established over a century ago. First, we chose to
run the experiments in three small villages in which we had ex ante hypotheses for how participants in the
village would act. These hypotheses are largely confirmed by the experiments. Second, the experiment was
run double-blind, so the experimenters could not subconsciously affect the outcomes in favor of the proposed
hypotheses. Third, the results supported the sub-hypotheses that the differences would largely arise from
participants whose grandparents were from the villages (admittedly, we were surprised by how strong these
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findings were). Fourth, these findings are consistent with a larger literature suggesting that Austrian and
Ottoman/Russian institutions had long run, still present effects on trust.
These results have implications for the role that culture can play in affecting economic outcomes and
vice versa. By identifying a cultural attribute that arguably has economic and institutional antecedents, we
avoid conflating the direction of causality. We also show that once a trait becomes imbued in a society’s (or,
in our case, village’s) culture, it can remain in spite of economic and political changes which entail that the
cultural trait is not necessarily a best response. Although we do not wish to push results from an experiment
in one Romanian commune too far, this insight has broad implications for the role that culture plays in the
evolution—or lack thereof—of economic and political institutions (also see Bisin and Verdier 2017, Iyigun
and Rubin 2017). If culture is indeed as “sticky” as our results suggest, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
understand the role of institutions on decision-making unless one also understands how a society’s culture
(and, possibly, its historical antecedents) interacts with institutions to incentivize behavior.
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A Appendix: Extra Tables and Robustness Checks
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
Table A1: Summary Statistics, General Trust in Others and Public Goods
Can People Unofficial
be Trusted Unofficial Payment Unofficial Unofficial
Can People (prior to Payment for Official Payment for Payment for
Side of Border be Trusted 1989) to Police Documents Education Medical
Austrian 0.65 0.81 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.41
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
N = 267 N = 244 N = 269 N = 272 N = 270 N = 274
Non-Austrian 0.66 0.81 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.38
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
N = 89 N = 70 N = 95 N = 92 N = 89 N = 94
p-value: Diff in Means 0.847 0.897 0.998 0.769 0.301 0.616
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. All
variables take value of 1 if subject answered 3, 4, or 5 on 5 point scale.
Table A2: Summary Statistics, Personal Finance
Have a Bank Borrowed from Lent to a Borrowed from Lent to
Side of Border Account a Co-Villager Co-Villager an Outsider an Outsider
Austrian 0.25 0.56 0.67 0.31 0.38
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
N = 291 N = 289 N = 295 N = 293 N = 290
Non-Austrian 0.28 0.71 0.77 0.38 0.46
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
N = 92 N = 97 N = 98 N = 99 N = 97
p-value: Diff in Means 0.545 0.009** 0.070 0.203 0.159
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
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Table A3: Summary Statistics, Experiment Results
Side of Border Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6
Austrian 0.95 0.82 0.62 0.77 0.64 0.68
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
N = 296 N = 291 N = 285 N = 284 N = 277 N = 270
Non-Austrian 0.99 0.95 0.55 0.82 0.28 0.44
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
N = 97 N = 95 N = 95 N = 93 N = 92 N = 86
p-value: Diff in Means 0.099 0.003** 0.227 0.351 0.000** 0.001**
Udes¸ti Poieni S¸tirba˘t
Total Earnings (USD) 13.49 18.21 18.34
(0.21) (0.35) (0.35)
N = 200 N = 100 N = 100
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
Earnings are lower in Udes¸ti (in part) because participants played two fewer rounds. p-value of difference in means between
earnings in Poieni and S¸tirba˘t is 0.633. Earnings were paid in Romanian leu. The exchange rate at the time of the experiment
was 4 leu: 1 USD.
Table A4: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders, Treated data unpooled
Sent More to
Sent to Co-villagers Sent to Outsiders Co-villagers (0/1)
Grandparents Grandparents Grandparents
from Village? from Village? from Village?
All Yes No All Yes No All Yes No
Udes¸ti 1.97 2.00 1.94 1.91 2.03 1.86 0.31 0.30 0.30
(Austrian) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
N 198 74 70 195 72 70 193 71 69
Poieni 2.04 2.19 1.94 1.76 1.75 1.79 0.34 0.44 0.29
(Austrian) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
N 100 37 48 99 36 48 99 36 48
S¸tirba˘t 2.16 2.04 2.30 1.85 1.48 1.98 0.43 0.59 0.44
(non-Austrian) (0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08)
N 100 27 43 100 27 43 100 27 43
p-values: Difference in Means
Udes¸ti vs. S¸tirba˘t 0.046* 0.851 0.023* 0.509 0.002** 0.440 0.035* 0.007** 0.141
Poieni vs. S¸tirba˘t 0.392 0.400 0.036* 0.611 0.141 0.302 0.211 0.248 0.139
Udes¸ti vs. Poieni 0.380 0.145 0.947 0.199 0.089 0.785 0.513 0.128 0.883
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. Sent
More to Home Village = 1 if participant sent more to co-villagers than to outsiders. Outsiders are defined as the other village
the participant played with in first four rounds.
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Table A5: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders, Participants whose Great-Grandparents are
and are not from the Village
Sent to Co-villagers Sent to Outsiders
Great-Grandparents Great-Grandparents
from Village? from Village?
Yes No Yes No
Austrian 2.09 1.94 1.96 1.83
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
N = 87 N = 142 N = 83 N = 143
Non-Austrian 1.95 2.31 1.50 1.92
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.18) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12)
N = 22 N = 48 N = 22 N = 48
p-value: Diff in Means 0.443 0.008** 0.008** 0.497
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
Outsiders are defined as the other village the participant played with in first four rounds
Table A6: Ordered Probit Regressions: Average Amount Sent to Co-villagers and Outsiders, with potentially
endogenous regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Sent to Co-villagers Sent to Outsiders
S¸tirba˘t Dummy 0.31 0.56* 0.08 0.28
(0.16) (0.23) (0.16) (0.23)
Grandparents from 0.04 0.01
Village Dummy (0.17) (0.17)
Grandparents from -0.49 -0.74*
Village * S¸tirba˘t (0.38) (0.37)
Order: Own First -0.16 -0.10 -0.46** -0.33
(0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17)
Know Someone 0.21 0.14 0.05 0.09
From Other Village (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)
N 293 237 289 233
Pseudo R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
QUIZ SCORE YES YES YES YES
DEMOGRAPHIC YES YES YES YES
FINANCE YES YES YES YES
PAY FOR SERVICE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Quiz Score is number correct out of 6 on incentivized quiz.
Demographic characteristics are a gender dummy, age, age squared, married dummy, high school education dummy, Eastern
Orthodox dummy, dummy for whether subjects attend religious services, and dummies for occupation type (not employed, blue
collar, agriculture, service, and other). Finance includes dummies for whether one has borrowed and lent to co-villagers and
outsiders. Pay for Service is an answer (1-5) regarding how often one has to pay bribes to police, for official documents, to
receive public education, and to receive medical treatment.
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Table A7: Average Amount Returned to Co-villagers and Outsiders, Participants whose Great-Grandparents
are and are not from the Village
If Sent 1 If Sent 2 If Sent 3
Great-Grandparents from Village?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Returned to Co-villagers
Austrian 1.87 2.05 3.29 3.41 4.92 4.89
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.09) (0.06) (0.16) (0.11) (0.26) (0.19)
N 86 143 85 143 85 141
Non-Austrian 2.00 2.02 3.55 3.55 5.18 5.08
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.17) (0.10) (0.41) (0.23) (0.56) (0.31)
N 22 48 22 47 22 48
p-value: Diff in Means 0.547 0.742 0.518 0.471 0.726 0.604
Returned to Outsiders
Austrian 1.78 1.78 3.13 3.30 4.61 4.82
(Udes¸ti and Poieni) (0.08) (0.06) (0.15) (0.12) (0.23) (0.19)
N 87 142 86 142 85 141
Non-Austrian 1.67 1.89 3.00 3.51 4.18 5.11
(S¸tirba˘t) (0.17) (0.12) (0.32) (0.25) (0.53) (0.36)
N 21 46 21 47 22 46
p-value: Diff in Means 0.466 0.376 0.512 0.378 0.421 0.440
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test.
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B Appendix: Sample Instructions (in English)36
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
B.1 Instructions: Send Decision
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making conducted by Cult Research on behalf of re-
searchers in the USA. The instructions are simple.
You will receive 10 lei simply for participating in the experiment. If you follow the instructions carefully, you
have the potential to earn a significant amount more. A Cult Research employee will collect your decisions
from the experiment, and a different Cult Research employee will calculate how much you earned during
the experiment. In one week, the Cult Research employee will return and pay you the amount you earned
during the experiment. Please note that if you talk to others during the experiment or exclaim out loud,
you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid.
There are 200 participants taking place in the experiment from Udes¸ti. You will not be told the names of
the other participants and they will not be told your name. All participants have identical instructions.
The Decision Situation
You will begin the experiment with 3 tokens. Each token is equivalent to 3 lei, meaning that you start the
experiment with 9 total lei.
You will be partnered with another participant from Udes¸ti. You will not know who you are partnered with
when you make your decisions, and you will not find out who you were partnered with after the experiment
is over. We will call this person your “partner” for the remainder of these instructions.
Your Decision
The Cult Research employee will give you a handout after the instructions are read. At the top of the
handout are numbers from 0 to 3.
You will circle one—and only one—of these numbers. The number you circle is the amount of your 3 tokens
you will send to the participant from Udes¸ti with whom you are matched. You can choose any number you
like, but you can only choose one number. You will keep any tokens you do not send to your partner.
Transferring Tokens to Your Partner
Your partner will receive 3 times the number of tokens you circled on your handout.
For example, if you choose 2 tokens, your partner will receive 6 tokens. If you choose 0 tokens, your partner
will receive 0 tokens. If you choose 3 tokens, your partner will receive 9 tokens.
The following table indicates how many tokens your partner receives for each possible amount you might
circle.
36These instructions were the ones given to the participants in Udes¸ti when they played with other participants in Udes¸ti (in the
order in which one played against their own village first). Instructions for the other villages were exactly the same, with only











Your partner will have the opportunity to return all, some, or none of the tokens you send them. They can
choose to return to you anywhere between 0 tokens and the number of tokens they receive.
For example, if you choose to send your partner 2 tokens, your partner will receive 6 tokens. This means
that they can choose to return to you 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 tokens.
For another example, if you choose to send your partner 1 token, your partner will receive 3 tokens. This
means that they can choose to return to you 0, 1, 2, or 3 tokens.
Your partner will not know how many tokens you sent them when they make their decision. Instead, they
will fill out the following table. This table indicates how many tokens they will return to you for each possible
number of tokens they received. Your partner will circle one number in each of the lower 3 boxes. We have






1 3 0 1 2 3
2 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Circle a number to return to your partner
End of the Experiment
After the experiment is over, we will look at how many tokens you sent to your partner. We will take
that amount and see what your partner says he/she would return to you should you send the amount you
indicated.
For example, say you choose to send 2 tokens to your partner. This is multiplied by 3, so your partner has
6 tokens. We then look to see how many tokens your partner chooses to return to you when you chose to
send him/her 2 tokens.
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You and Your Partner’s Income
You will keep each token you do not send to your partner. Your will also keep all tokens that your partner
returns to you. At the end of the experiment, each token will be converted to 3 lei and paid to you in cash
in one week.
Your Total Income = Tokens you do not send to your partner (= 3 tokens – amount you send) + Amount
returned to you by your partner
Your Partner’s Total Income = 3*Tokens you send – amount your partner returns to you
Examples
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose that you decide to send 1 token to your partner. This 1 token is multiplied by
3, meaning that your partner receives 3 tokens. Suppose that in the box next to 1, your partner circles 2,
meaning that she will return 2 tokens to you and keep 1 token. Your total earnings are therefore (3 – 1) +
2 = 4 tokens. Your partner’s earnings are 3 – 2 = 1 token.
EXAMPLE 2: Suppose that you decide to send 3 tokens to your partner. These 3 tokens are multiplied by
3, meaning that your partner receives 9 tokens. Suppose that in the box next to 3, your partner chooses 2,
meaning that she will return 2 tokens to you and keep 7 tokens. Your total earnings are therefore (3 – 3) +
2 = 2 tokens. Your partner’s earnings are 9 – 2 = 7 tokens.
The Cult Research employee will now hand out a short quiz to test your understanding of the experiment.
Playing the Game
You have been randomly matched with a participant from Udes¸ti. You will play this game only once. Please
circle one (and only one) number on the handout that the Cult Research employee will hand to you shortly.
At the end of the experiment, we will convert each of your tokens into 3 lei.
B.2 Instructions: Return Decision
You will now participate in the same experiment you just participated in, except now your role will be
reversed. Like before, there are 200 participants taking place in the experiment from Udes¸ti. You will not
be told the names of the other participants and they will not be told your name. All participants have
identical instructions. You will not be matched with the same person you were matched with in the previous
experiment. We will briefly refresh you on the decision situation below.
The Decision Situation
You will begin the experiment with 0 tokens. Each token is equivalent to 3 lei, meaning that you start the
experiment with 0 total lei. You will be matched with another participant from Udes¸ti.
Tokens sent to you by your partner are multiplied by three. You will then be given the opportunity to
return none, some, or all of the tokens your partner sent to you. You will keep any tokens you do not
return to your partner.
Your Decision
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Your partner will circle the amount he/she will send to you. They can circle any number between 0 and 3.
You will receive 3 times the number of tokens your partner circled on his/her handout. You will not know
how many tokens your partner from Udes¸ti sent to you when you make your decision. Instead, you will
fill out the following table. This table indicates how many tokens you will return to your partner for each
possible number of tokens they sent you. You will circle one number in each of the last 3 boxes. Please note
that we have already circled “0” next to the top box because that is your only option. You do not need to






1 3 0 1 2 3
2 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Circle a number to return to your partner
You and Your Partner’s Income
You will keep each token you do not return to your partner. At the end of the experiment, each token will
be converted to 3 lei and paid to you in cash in one week.
Your Total Income = 3*Tokens your partner sends – amount you return to your partner
Your Partner’s Total Income = Tokens he/she does not send to you (= 3 tokens – amount he/she sends) +
Amount you return to him/her
Playing the Game
You have been randomly matched with a participant from Udes¸ti. You will play this game only once. Please
circle one (and only one) number in each of the three bottom boxes on the handout that the Cult Research
employee will hand to you shortly (you do not need to circle a number in the first box; we have already
circled 0 for you). At the end of the experiment, we will convert each of your tokens into 3 lei.
B.3 Quiz
The 6 questions below will test your understanding of the experiment. You will be paid 0.75 leu for each
question you answer correctly. You will not be paid for incorrect answers. Please write your answer on the
line provided next to each question. If we cannot read your answers, they will be counted as incorrect.
The Situation: Suppose that you decide to send 2 tokens to your partner by circling the 2 on your handout
as follows:
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Suppose that the participant with whom you are randomly matched (your partner) fills out their handout
as on the following page.
Question 1: How many tokens will your partner return to you?
Question 2: How many total tokens will you earn?
Question 3: How many total tokens will your partner earn?
Now, instead of assuming that you chose to send 2 tokens to your partner, assume that you chose to send
3 tokens. Please answer the following questions, assuming that your partner fills out their handout as on
the following page.
Question 4: How many tokens will your partner return to you?
Question 5: How many total tokens will you earn?






1 3 0 1 2 3
2 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Circle a number to return to your partner
B.4 Survey37
Please fill out this brief survey by circling the answer that most accurately applies. If there is a line next
to a question, please enter your answer on the line. Your entries are confidential: none of the information
in this survey will ever be matched to your name or shared with anybody outside of those conducting the
experiment.
1) What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
2) What is your age?
37This sample survey is the one given to participants in Udes¸ti. Participants in Poieni and S¸tirba˘t received surveys with different
questions 23, 24, and 25, since they played against participants from both villages. Questions 5-7 were re-worded in Poieni and
S¸tirba˘t to reflect their home village, while questions 19-22 were re-worded to reflect the other two villages.
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4) What is the highest level of education you completed?
a. None, or lower than grade school




5) Have you lived in Udes¸ti your entire life?
a. Yes
b. No
6) If you answered “No” to Question 5, how long have you lived in Udes¸ti?
7) To your knowledge, how long has your family lived in Udes¸ti?
a. You moved to Udes¸ti during your lifetime
b. Your parents moved to Udes¸ti
c. Your grandparents moved to Udes¸ti
d. Your great-grandparents or an older generation moved to Udes¸ti
e. I don’t know
8) What is your occupation?




d. Other (please list)
10) How often do you attend religious services?
a. Never
b. Once or twice a year (or less)
c. Several times a year
d. Once a month
e. 2-3 times a month
f. Weekly
g. Several times a week
11) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people? Please answer on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means that you have complete distrust
in people, and 5 means that most people can be trusted.
a. What would it be today? (please answer 1 through 5)
b. And before 1989? (please answer 1 through 5)
12) In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts
in these situations? Please answer on a scale from 1 to 5, where the scale is as follows: (Scale: Never=1,
Seldom=2, Sometimes=3, Usually=4, Always=5)
a. Interact with road police (please answer 1 through 5)
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b. Dealing with official documents (1 through 5)
c. Receive public education (1 through 5)
d. Receive medical treatment (1 through 5)
13) Do you have a bank account?
a. Yes
b. No
14) Have you ever borrowed money from someone living in Udes¸ti?
a. Yes
b. No
15) Have you ever lent money to someone living in Udes¸ti?
a. Yes
b. No
16) Have you ever borrowed money from someone living outside of Udes¸ti?
a. Yes
b. No
17) Have you ever lent money to someone living outside of Udes¸ti?
a. Yes
b. No






19) Do you know anybody from S¸tirba˘t?
a. Yes
b. No






21) Do you know anybody from Poieni?
a. Yes
b. No











24) If you answered “Yes” to Question 23, why did you make your choices differently? Please answer
below, and use as much space as needed.
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C Appendix: Sample Instructions (in Romanian)38
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
C.1 Instructions: Send Decision
Aceasta este un studiu cu caracter economic despre luarea deciziilor. Acesta este condus de Cult Research
din partea cerceta˘torilor din Statele Unite ale Americii. Instruct¸iunile sunt simple.
Vet¸i primi 10 lei doar pentru simpla participare la experiment. Daca˘ vet¸i urma˘ri instruct¸iunile cu atent¸ie,
avet¸i posibilitatea sa˘ caˆs¸tigat¸i o suma˘ mai mare de bani. Unul dintre angajat¸ii Cult Research va colecta
deciziile dumneavoastra˘ cu privire la experiment, iar un alt angajat de la Cult Research va calcula caˆt de
mult at¸i caˆs¸tigat de-a lungul experimentului. Iˆntr-o sa˘pta˘maˆna˘, reprezentantul Cult Research se va ıˆntoarce
s¸i va˘ va oferi suma de bani pe care at¸i acumulat-o de-a lungul experimentului. Va˘ ruga˘m sa˘ fit¸i atent¸i la
faptul ca˘ daca˘ vet¸i vorbi cu ceilalt¸i ıˆn timpul experimentului sau daca˘ va˘ vet¸i exprima cu voce tare, vet¸i fi
rugat sa˘ pa˘ra˘sit¸i ıˆnca˘perea s¸i nu vet¸i fi pla˘tit.
Vor fi un numa˘r de participant¸i care participa˘ la experiment din localitatea Udes¸ti. Nu le vet¸i spune numele
dumneavoastra˘ celorlalt¸i participant¸i la studiu s¸i ei nu va˘ vor spune numele lor. Tot¸i participant¸ii vor avea
instruct¸iuni identice.
Situat¸ia de decizie
Vet¸i ıˆncepe experimentul cu 3 jetoane. Fiecare jeton este echivalent cu 3 lei, acest lucru ıˆnsemnaˆnd ca˘ vet¸i
ıˆncepe experimentul cu un total de 9 lei.
Vet¸i fi pus ıˆn lega˘tura˘ cu un alt participant din localitatea Udes¸ti. Nu vet¸i s¸ti cu cine at¸i fost pus ıˆn lega˘tura˘
atunci caˆnd luat¸i deciziile s¸i nici nu vet¸i s¸ti cu cine at¸i fost pun ıˆn lega˘tura˘ odata˘ ce experimentul s-a ıˆncheiat.
Iˆi vom spune acestei persoane ca˘ este “partenerul” dumneavoastra˘ pentru restul acestor instruct¸iuni.
Decizia dumneavoastra˘
Un angajat Cult Research va˘ va ıˆnmaˆna un suport de haˆrtie dupa˘ ce instruct¸iunile au fost citite. Iˆn partea
de sus a acestuia sunt numere de la 0 la 3.
Va trebui sa˘ ıˆncercuit¸i unul – s¸i doar unul - dintre aceste numere. Numa˘rul pe care ıˆl ıˆncercuit¸i reprezinta˘ caˆte
din cele 3 jetoane pe care le avet¸i decidet¸i sa˘ i le trimitet¸i participantului din Udes¸ti cu care dumneavoastra˘
suntet¸i pus ıˆn lega˘tura˘. Putet¸i alege orice numa˘r dorit¸i, dar sa˘ fit¸i atent¸i sa˘ fie doar un singur numa˘r. Vet¸i
pa˘stra orice jeton pe care nu ıˆl vet¸i trimite partenerului dumneavoastra˘.
Transferul de jetoane ca˘tre partenerul dumneavoastra˘
Partenerul dumneavoastra˘ va primi de 3 ori mai multe jetoane decaˆt at¸i ıˆncercuit pe suportul de haˆrtie.
De exemplu, daca˘ aleget¸i 2 jetoane, partenerul dumneavoastra˘ va primi 6 jetoane. Daca˘ aleget¸i 0 jetoane,
partenerul dumneavoastra˘ va primi 0 jetoane. Daca˘ aleget¸i 3 jetoane, partenerul dumneavoastra˘ va primi 9
de jetoane.
Tabelul ala˘turat indica˘ numa˘rul de jetoane pe care ıˆl poate primi partenerul dumneavoastra˘ pentru fiecare












Partenerul dumneavoastra˘ are oportunitatea sa˘ returneze tot, o parte sau niciunul dintre jetoanele pe care
dumneavoastra˘ i le-at¸i trimis. El are opt¸iunea sa˘ returneze orice numa˘r de jetoane cuprins ıˆntre zero s¸i
numa˘rul de jetoane pe care ıˆl primesc.
De exemplu, daca˘ aleget¸i sa˘ ıˆi trimitet¸i partenerului dumneavoastra˘ 2 jetoane, acesta va primi 6 jetoane.
Acest lucru ıˆnseamna˘ ca˘ el poate alege sa˘ va˘ returneze 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 sau 6 jetoane.
Un alt exemplu: daca˘ dumneavoastra˘ aleget¸i sa˘ ıˆi trimitet¸i partenerului dumneavoastra˘ 1 jeton, acesta va
primi 3 jetoane. Acest lucru ıˆnseamna˘ ca˘ el poate alege sa˘ va˘ returneze 0, 1, 2 sau 3 jetoane.
Partenerul dumneavoastra˘ nu va s¸ti caˆte jetoane i-at¸i trimis atunci caˆnd va lua propria decizie. Iˆn schimb,
el va completa tabelul urma˘tor. Acest tabel arata˘ caˆte jetoane va˘ va returna pentru fiecare numa˘r posibil
de jetoane pe care ıˆl primes¸te. Partenerul dumneavoastra˘ va ıˆncercui un numa˘r ıˆn fiecare din cele 3 ca˘sut¸e.
Am ıˆncercuit noi deja 0 pentru dumneavoastra˘ ıˆn prima ca˘sut¸a˘, deoarece daca˘ trimitet¸i zero, partenerul






1 3 0 1 2 3
2 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Încercuiţi un număr pentru a-l returna partenerului dumneavoastră. 
Sfaˆrs¸itul acestui experiment
Dupa˘ ce experimentul se ıˆncheie, ne vom uita la caˆte jetoane at¸i trimis partenerului. Vom lua acea suma˘ s¸i
vom vedea ce va˘ va returna partenerul dumneavoastra˘ atunci caˆnd dumneavoastra˘ ıˆi trimitet¸i suma indicata˘.
38As in Appendix B, we only provide instructions for the send and return decisions of the paricipants from Udes¸ti when they
played with other participants from Udes¸ti. Instructions for Poieni and S¸tirba˘t were the same, with the name of the villages
changed.
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De exemplu, sa˘ spunem ca˘ aleget¸i sa˘ trimitet¸i 2 jetoane partenerului dumneavoastra˘. Acestea se ıˆnmult¸esc
cu trei, astfel partenerului dumneavoastra˘ ıˆi revine 6 jetoane. Atunci, ne vom uita la caˆte jetoane alege
partenerul dumneavoastra˘ sa˘ va˘ returneze atunci caˆnd dumneavoastra˘ aleget¸i sa˘ ıˆi trimitet¸i 2 jetoane.
Venitul dumneavoastra˘ s¸i al partenerului
Vet¸i pa˘stra fiecare jeton pe care aleget¸i sa˘ nu ıˆl trimitet¸i partenerului. De asemenea, vet¸i pa˘stra toate
jetoanele pe care vi le returneaza˘ partenerul. La sfaˆrs¸itul experimentului, fiecare jeton va fi convertit ıˆntr-un
leu, iar plata se va face ıˆntr-o sa˘pta˘maˆna˘.
Venitul dumneavoastra˘ total = Jetoanele pe care nu le-at¸i trimis partenerului dumneavoastra˘ (=3 jetoane
– suma pe care o trimite Participantul 1) + Suma returnata˘ de partenerul dumneavoastra˘.
Venitul total al partenerului dumneavoastra˘ = 3* jetoanele pe care i le-at¸i trimis – suma pe care
partenerul decide sa˘ v-o returneze.
Examples
EXEMPLUL 1: Sa˘ presupunem ca˘ dumneavoastra˘ decidet¸i sa˘ trimitet¸i 1 jeton partenerului dumneavoastra˘.
Acest jeton va fi ıˆnmult¸it cu 3, ceea ce ıˆnseamna˘ ca˘ partenerul dumneavoastra˘ va primi 3 jetoane. Sa˘
presupunem ca˘ ıˆn ca˘sut¸a ala˘turata˘ numa˘rului 1, partenerul dumneavoastra˘ va ıˆncercui 2, ceea ce ıˆnseamna˘
ca˘ acesta va returna 2 jetoane s¸i va pa˘stra 1 jeton. Caˆs¸tigul total al dumneavoastra˘ este (3 - 1) + 2 = 4
jetoane. Partenerul dumneavoastra˘ are un caˆs¸tig de 3 – 2 = 1 jeton.
EXEMPLUL 2: Sa˘ presupunem ca˘ dumneavoastra˘ decidet¸i sa˘ trimitet¸i 3 jetoane Participantului 2. Aceste
3 jetoane sunt ıˆnmult¸ite cu 3, ceea ce ıˆnseamna˘ ca˘ Participantul 2 va primi 9 de jetoane. Sa˘ presupunem
ca˘ ıˆn ca˘sut¸a ala˘turata˘ numa˘rului 3, partenerul dumneavoastra˘ va scrie 2, ceea ce ıˆnseamna˘ ca˘ acesta va˘ va
returna 2 jetoane s¸i va pa˘stra 7 jetoane. Caˆs¸tigul dumneavoastra˘ total este de (3 – 3) + 2 = 2 jetoane.
Partenerul dumneavoastra˘ are un caˆs¸tig de 9 – 2 = 7 jetoane.
Un reprezentant Cult Research va˘ va ıˆnmaˆna un scurt test pentru a verifica daca˘ dumneavoastra˘ at¸i ıˆnt¸eles
cerint¸ele experimentului.
Desfa˘s¸urarea jocului
At¸i fost pus ıˆn lega˘tura˘ ıˆn mod aleatoriu cu un participant la studiu din Udes¸ti. Va˘ vet¸i juca acest joc
o singura˘ data˘. Va˘ ruga˘m sa˘ ıˆncercuit¸i un singur numa˘r pe suportul de haˆrtie pe care vi-l va ıˆnmaˆna un
angajat de la Cult Research ıˆn scurt timp. La sfaˆrs¸itul experimentului, va˘ vom converti fiecare jeton pe care
ıˆl avet¸i ıˆn 3 lei.
C.2 Instructions: Return Decision
Acum vet¸i participa la acelas¸i experiment la care tocmai at¸i participat, cu except¸ia ca˘ rolul dumneavoastra˘
va fi inversat. La fel ca ıˆnainte, vor participa la experiment un numa˘r de persoane din Udes¸ti. Nu vi se vor
spune numele celorlalt¸i participant¸i s¸i nici dumneavoastra˘ nu vet¸i spune celorlalt¸i numele dumneavoastra˘.
Tot¸i participant¸ii vor avea aceleas¸i instruct¸iuni. Nu vet¸i fi pus ıˆn lega˘tura˘ cu aceeas¸i persoana˘ cu care at¸i
corespondat ıˆn cadrul experimentului anterior. O sa˘ va˘ reamintim pe scurt ıˆn ce consta˘ situat¸ia de decizie.
Situat¸ia de decizie
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Vet¸i ıˆncepe experimentul cu 0 jetoane. Fiecare jeton este echivalentul a 3 lei, ceea ce ıˆnseamna˘ ca˘ vet¸i ıˆncepe
experimentul cu un total de 0 lei. Vet¸i fi pus ıˆn lega˘tura˘ cu un alt participant din Udes¸ti.
Jetoanele trimise de partenerul dumneavoastra˘ vor fi multiplicate de trei ori. Vet¸i putea returna zero,
caˆteva sau toate jetoanele primite de la partenerul dumneavoastra˘. Vet¸i pa˘stra jetoanele pe care nu le-at¸i
trimis partenerului.
Decizia dumneavoastra˘
Partenerul dumneavoastra˘ va ıˆncercui suma pe care el/ea decid sa˘ v-o trimita˘. El poate ıˆncercui orice numa˘r
cuprins ıˆntre 0 s¸i 3.
Vet¸i primi de 3 ori numa˘rul jetoanelor pe care partenerul dumneavoastra˘ ıˆl ıˆncercuies¸te ıˆn materialul lui
printat. Nu vet¸i s¸ti caˆte jetoane at¸i primit de la partenerul dumneavoastra˘ din Udes¸ti atunci caˆnd vet¸i lua
decizia. Iˆn schimb, vet¸i completa urma˘torul tabel. Acest tabel arata˘ caˆte jetoane se vor ıˆntoarce la partenerul
dumneavoastra˘ pentru fiecare numa˘r posibil de jetoane pe care acesta vi-l va trimite. Vet¸i ıˆncercui un numa˘r
ıˆn fiecare dintre cele 3 ca˘sut¸e. Va˘ ruga˘m sa˘ fit¸i atent¸i la faptul ca˘ am ıˆncercuit deja 0, deoarece aceasta este






1 3 0 1 2 3
2 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
3 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Încercuiţi un număr pentru a-l returna partenerului dumneavoastră. 
Venitul dumneavoastra˘ s¸i cel al partenerului
Vet¸i pa˘stra fiecare jeton pe care nu ıˆl vet¸i returna partenerului dumneavoastra˘. La sfaˆrs¸itul experimentului
fiecare jeton va fi convertit ıˆn 3 lei s¸i vet¸i fi pla˘tit ıˆn numerar ıˆntr-o sa˘pta˘maˆna˘.
Venitul dumneavoastra˘ total = 3*jetoanele pe care vi le trimite partenerul – suma pe care o returnat¸i
partenerului.
Venitul total al partenerului dumneavoastra˘ = jetoanele pe care acesta nu vi le trimite (=3 jetoane - suma
pe care nu v-o trimite) + suma pe care dumneavoastra˘ o returnat¸i.
Desfa˘s¸urarea jocului
At¸i fost pus ıˆn lega˘tura˘ ıˆn mod aleator cu un participant din Udes¸ti. Va˘ vet¸i juca acest joc o singura˘ data˘.
Va˘ ruga˘m sa˘ ıˆncercuit¸i un singur numa˘r ıˆn fiecare ca˘sut¸a˘ din materialul printat pe care vi l-a ıˆnmaˆnat unul
dintre reprezentant¸ii Cult Research (nu va trebui sa˘ ıˆncercuit¸i un numa˘r ıˆn prima ca˘sut¸a˘; am ıˆncercuit noi
deja 0 pentru dumneavoastra˘). La sfaˆrs¸itul experimentului vom converti fiecare jeton ıˆn 3 lei.
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